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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
JAMES M. LUNNEN, ) 
Petitioner, ) 
) BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS 
v. ) 
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF ) 
TRANSPORTATION, and the CAREER ) Case No. 93-0737 CA 
SERVICE REVIEW BOARD OF THE ) 
STATE OF UTAH, ) Priority 14 
Respondents. ) 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This appeal is from a final judgment of the Career Service 
Review Board of the State of Utah. Jurisdiction in this matter is 
conferred upon this court under Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-14 (1994) . 
NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
This appeal is from the final decision of the Utah Career 
Service Review Board (CSRB), an administrative agency of the State 
of Utah. A formal evidentiary hearing was held under the Utah 
Administrat ive Procedures Act, Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-1 et. seq. 
(1993) and the decision rendered was appealed to the CSRB. The 
CSRB sustained the hearing officer's decision after clarifying 
certain issues raised in that appeal. Petitioner Lunnen appeals 
from the CSRB decision denying his grievance and sustaining the 
discipline imposed by the Department of Transportation. 
1 
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Respondents assert the relevant issues to be: 
1. Whether the CSRB properly placed the burden of 
establishing inconsistency of treatment and abuse of discretion on 
the party claiming it. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: The conclusion of the CSRB is a 
conclusion of law and is reviewed for correctness with no deference 
being given to the agency's conclusion. Savage Industries. Inc. v. 
State Tax Comm'n, 811 P.2d 664 (Utah 1991); Morton Int'l, Inc. v. 
Auditing Div., 814 P.2d 581 (Utah 1991). 
2 • Whether the reopening of the record by the hearing 
officer constituted reversible or harmless error. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: The determination of whether actions 
taken constitute prejudicial or harmless error are conclusions of 
law. The CSRB's conclusions are given no deference and are 
reviewed on a correctness standard. Savage, supra, and Morton, 
supra. 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES 
The following statutes and rules are applicable in this 
matter. The text of the provisions either appears in the text of 
the argument or in the Addendum to this brief: 
STATUTES: 
1. Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16(4) (h) (iii) (1993) 
2. Utah Code Ann. § 67-19-18(1) (1993) 
3. Utah Code Ann. § 67-19-18(5) (1993) 
2 
ADMINISTRATIVE RULES: 
1 . L a;. . : - ; i ; , ... .... ,^. . ) 
2 . U t a h Admir: J\>de r..'<* ; . , .-"- *  
3 . U - •) 
4 . U t a h Adrru^ : -u . . -•-) 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
cuts fci emergencies, was demoted . ^ * :..:- - - •t-:;_., »- ~c.r 
hav- , i •- - . \*.a* : e,i dispatr ordere : ;..:*. 
f 
Department - Transpc :* al ,' .. w, .^^ --^  ..-. . demote-:. 
Peti *• • " ^•^v- -ppealed the i;r- ~"* " r- ^c, > T * • ~*= "^PP wr:ri 
ass r 
issuec a* *:ter,-: jei requesting that furthe. nformat - re 
supplied L - rv * -;rtTcnt. Upon r -e * -< cnaL 
informatioi . . ^i ... cirpr issnpr . . 3 
Pet. --: - gr.cvai •- * Lowing a:.= ipline *' . 
Pet l - Liiuei'B aecis±oxi iu m e ^ SRB 
which, ,„ .. . ,•;.  v .,c ^  ..::c . L. :ei, , transcript and evidence, 
modified several -: : .. :\ ridings arid issi>,-^  ts final order denying 
t i : f 
Pet. ~.. oner, i > ... decisi . - . .loner appeals 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
T!" 1- I i"> 1 I«;'' "i"' o i; i s i ,s i 11 1
 (-i 11 i b b i H } " I at, e d & i, a i; P me n r n £ 
pertinent facts this appeal. The Petitioner is not challenging 
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the finding of insubordination. The following facts, however, are 
set forth to present an understanding of the basis of the demotion. 
1. Petitioner was a Highway Operations Specialist. (Hearing 
officer Findings of Fact 3, hereinafter cited as FF 3, R.4). 
2. As part of Petitioner's responsibilities, he was subject 
to 24 hour call-out. (FF 4, R.4) 
3. Petitioner had the poorest response rate of anyone of his 
crew. He responded only 3 of 14 times. This constitutes a 20% 
call-out rate. (FF 22, R.6). 
4. Petitioner was rated between successful and unsuccessful 
in his 1991 appraisal for 24 hour call-out (FF 17, R.5) and fully 
unsuccessful for the 24 hour call-out for the 1992 appraisal (FF 
18, R.5). 
5. In April 1992, Petitioner was summoned to a meeting with 
his supervisor and informed that disciplinary action would be taken 
if he did not improve his response to call-outs. (FF 23, R.6) . 
6. Department policy was clear that if an employee was home 
and received a phone call to report, the employee reported (R.279, 
283). Petitioner testified " [i]f you are home you respond" 
(R.321). 
7 • Petitioner knew he was subject to 24 hour call-out, with 
the obligation to respond if he was at home (R.321, 33 9, 344-5) . 
8. Petitioner had problems with call-outs (R.228) and crew 
members complained about his failure to respond (R.235-6). 
9. On the evening of June 12, 1992, Petitioner received a 
call from Dispatch telling him it was headquarters and that he was 
4 
t west. a.. in Salt Lake County, 
Pet. ... _•. -• i s p a t c h that b<=> wm.r. it- t h e r e (R 311 2 3i( FT 
26, K 7) 
1 0 . P e t : t i c: i n : i < :! :i < :t i: i < : >1 : :i : ep < > t: t (R Il 6' ; 2 3 5 3 3 9 4 0') . A f t e r 1 
3/4 houxs of wa iting for Petitioner, Dispatch called Petitioner a 
second time but cou3 d not get through (R ,196, 215, FF 27, R , 7 ) . 
1 1 . WTiIJ e Pet i t i one: ai r I 1: :i :ii s , :ii :!i = t e s t d f i e d t h a t till: ie;y Li: 101 lght 
i t was a p r a n k (R.3 0 3 , 31 3) , P e t i t i o n e r ccn i l d l o c a t e no one who 
v e r i f i e d :i t was a p i auk' and d i d not ca l ] d i spat ch t o v e r i f y i t s 
authei i t i c i try (1 1 2 8 J , 33 9) I le s i i i: ipll y dl :i d i ::i :: •t :i : e p o i t ai id i ; e i i t t o 
b e d .; ; .. 1 r ' •- -/ - }• ., 
1' *^ - '••'•-4- - " • r?ner v*--*- ' • <-•--? K.- *• • :\ea •  * ' h;s telephone 
answei 
13. Based • rtit doner's nisrcry c: :;;::; response cal] -
ouib etna a nsubordination ±a nui responding: v. une eve: ng of-. 
June i^ .  - ,. ;•:: .'..loner's supervisors and .., ..„stri rt d~ ."ector 
recommended a demotion (FF 28, R 7) . 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Employees may be demoted or dismissed from, service for 
insubordination. There • prong-tc-.^i . *L -, — be applied to 
del" ei"nil i irn » wli^t HIP?" am H> rst, , the 
agency must establish t^c*- <*..u . --.a-. .. happened took 
place. Second,, the discipline wil] be sustained unless the 
discipline1 i 11 in al MI I'd e 
discipline as being abus. excessive have the burden of proving 
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the inappropriateness of discipline. It is not an agency's 
obligation to establish consistency of application. 
Any error committed by the hearing officer in reopening the 
record was harmless error in that the record is replete with 
evidence that the punishment was not an abuse of discretion. 
Petitioner has the obligation to marshall the evidence and show a 
substantial likelihood that, but for the error the result would 
have been different. In this matter, Petitioner has presented 
nothing to show the outcome would have been different if the record 
had not been reopened. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE CSRB CORRECTLY DETERMINED THAT PETITIONER 
HAS THE OBLIGATION TO ESTABLISH INCONSISTENCY 
WITH PRIOR DISCIPLINARY MATTERS AND TO 
ESTABLISH THAT THE INCONSISTENCY CONSTITUTES 
AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION. 
In Utah Dep't of Corrections v. Despain, 824 P.2d 439 (Utah 
App. 1991), this Court stated: 
The CSRB's role in examining the Department's 
personnel actions is a limited one. The CSRB 
is restricted to determining whether there is 
factual support for the Department's charges 
against Despain and, if so, whether the 
Department's sanction of dismissal is so 
disproportionate to those charges that it 
amounts to an abuse of discretion. 
824 P.2d at 443. 
In a subsequent appeal of a disciplinary matter before this 
court, Kent v. Dep't of Employment Security, 860 P. 2d 984 (Utah 
App. 1993), the position taken in Despain was affirmed. This Court 
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emphasized that, i f the department head finds "adequate cause or 
i ~ -•  - t he d i s c ip ] i na i: y 
decision ^ --.. -, .- sustained. "Accordingly, ti*e CSRB must affirm the 
Department's decision if :I t is w:i thin the bounds of reasonableness 
and i at::i c >na] i t} " 860 I • 2d ; .1 98 ; 
In Kent, the court held that section 67-19- 1 8(5) and Utah 
Adm i n Code R4 7 7 - 3 3 e s t ab 1 i s he d " bounda r i e s t h a t 1 i m :i t t he 
Depai trrtei it: , , m ,< < : 1: < ;: i: e t i c )i i ' ' 86 0 I 2 i a/1 : 9 8' ; I Jnless the 
employee being disciplined shows that the Department's exercise of 
discretion :i it: i der~t -• * *-: -*••«•-"•- beyond the scope of 
r easoi lablei less am I i -I a A , the 
discipline must be sustained court continued: 
The Department i ,<± , c^ni:i:f- with the 
administr^^iv~ i..:es governing : .e dismissal 
of a career service employee. As we have 
already noted, the Department's action took 
into account, the principles of d.**- process, in 
accordance administrative rule. 
Accordingly, une .enartment's decision to 
dismiss Kent was within the bounds of 
reasonableness and rationality. 
86 0 P.2d at 987, 
]
 (l Pe+- i t i PTJ< " i '"'oiK'^ded t iMt t h e 
Department had presented substantial evidence of misconduct (R.44). 
Thus, the issue of whether Petitioner was insubordinate was never 
c jed c /!:: t l i = C S I IB II = • = 1 a ,i :i :::i :ii s :i: i : -t I: = i i lg chal ] enged before 
this Court. In his Inter irn Or der, tl le hearing officer declared: 
There is no doubt Grievant disobeyed the 
orders of a superior. Disobedience to the 
orders of a superior is insubordination. The 
act is also malfeasance and misfeasance in 
that Lunnen did not do something he should 
have done and/or di d i t wrongful] y. No matter 
how we characterize the act, it meets the 
requirement for discipline. 
Hearing Officer Interim Order (emphasis added R.9-10). 
For purposes of this appeal, the grounds upon which discipline 
was taken were substantiated. Petitioner never presented any 
evidence or testimony regarding inconsistent treatment between 
himself and others at the hearing. As such, the focal point of 
this appeal must center on whether the agency satisfies the second 
prong of the Kent test: Did it act reasonably and rationally in 
imposing a demotion on Lunnen as discipline for insubordination? 
Utah Code Ann. § 67-19-18(1) states as follows: 
Career service employees may be dismissed or 
demoted only to advance the good of the public 
interest, and for just causes as inefficiency, 
incompetency, failure to maintain skills or 
adequate performance levels, insubordination, 
disloyalty to the orders of a superior, 
misfeasance, malfeasance, or nonfeasance in 
office. 
Thereafter, under section 67-19-18(5), department directors 
are obligated to follow procedural requirements before demoting 
employees. There is no allegation that these procedures were not 
followed. Subsection (5)(e) states that "[f]ollowing the hearing, 
the employee may be dismissed or demoted if the department head 
finds adequate cause or reason." 
The department director therefore exercises his discretion in 
determining what discipline to impose after the hearing, based on 
the cause or reason found. It is that decision which thereafter 
becomes the focus of appeals. If an employee appeals the action, 
a formal de novo hearing is held before an independent CSRB hearing 
8 
officer. See Utah Code Ann, §§ 67 19a 101 to 4 08 (1993) . The CSRB 
has promulgated rules in relation to those hearings that establish 
the responsibility of hearing officers relative to these matters, 
Utah Admin. Code R137-1 20,C.2, states, with emphasis added: 
When the CSkb nearing officer determines in 
accordance with the procedures set forth above 
that the evidentiary/step 5 factual findings 
support the allegations of the agency or the 
appointing authority, then the CSRB hearing 
officer must determine whether the agency's 
decision, including any disciplinary sanctions 
imposed, is excessive, disproportionate or 
otherwise constitutes an abuse of discretion. 
In making this latter determination, the CSRB 
hearing officer shall give deference to the 
decision of the agency or the appointing 
authority unless the agency's penalty is 
determined to be excessive, disproportionate 
or constitutes an abuse of discretion in which 
instance the CSRB hearing officer shall 
determine the appropriate remedy. 
T 1 aces ' i i- : • ] :>ii:i : ciei i c i I tl i€ agei icy to establisl I a 
negative f* i~ :s action was not an abuse of di scretion) , but 
direct'- * • - — *-- ng officer to determine whether the discipline; in 
light : ~ -ence presented, was "excessive, d isproportionate 
cr abuse of discretion," That: is a legal determination 
made jjy ^ne nedi±ng officer based on what he hear s and he] i eves 
from, the evidence presented. 
IT LH :-.:. -jericy's burden to prove its case through substanr.; ^  L 
evidence. ±n ui. \x wox d s , p r o v • ' • 1 c- ii|nin 3 
t a k e n a n d a reasonable relationship ...he discipline:; imposed. See 
Utah Code Ann. •- 19a-406 .  ; and Despain, 824 P 2d at 443, II: 
i :> !:: ::: ::ii sprove 11 s 11 i <n i i n: 
prove employee's challenge to the discipline. Pursuant to 
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section 67-19-18 (5) (e) , the executive director may demote an 
employee if he finds adequate cause or reason. That is what the 
agency is required to present in the hearing to establish the 
grounds for discipline. Whether the demotion is an abuse of 
discretion will depend on how that information "stands on its own" 
and whether the hearing officer, in light of evidence presented by 
an employee, deems it abusive. 
In this case, the hearing officer found that the discipline 
was appropriate and, as required by CSRB rule, gave deference to 
the agency decision. 
Petitioner misunderstands the relationship between an agency's 
"burden of proof" and general "principles of due process." In an 
attempt to support his position, Petitioner cites Utah Admin. Code 
R477-11-1.(1), which states that principles of due process shall 
include various factors including consistent application. The 
factors noted in the rule do not create separate specific burdens 
in presenting a case and are certainly not technical concepts with 
fixed elements. 
The Utah Supreme Court has clearly expressed this admonition, 
which originated with the United States Supreme Court: 
"[D]ue process" is not a technical concept 
with a fixed content unrelated to time, place 
and circumstances which can be imprisoned 
within the treacherous limits of any formula. 
Rather the demands of due process rest on the 
concept of basic fairness of procedure and 
demand a procedure appropriate to the case and 
just to the parties involved. 
RUDD v. Grantsville City, 610 P.2d 338, 341 (Utah 1980); see also 
Anti-Fascist Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123 (1951). 
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In addition to "consistency of treatment," other factors are 
1 , i • R i ; ; Il 1 ] ( I) 1 .1 L. .1 agency management may use in 
determining disciplirie, An employee may 1 ikewise use these factors 
to establish that the discipiixie was too severe. 
In determining the specific type and severity 
of the discipline to be taken, consideration 
may be given to such factors as the severity 
of the infraction, the repeated nature of 
violations, prior disciplinary/corrective 
actions, previous oral warnings, written 
warnings and discussions, the employee's past 
work record, the effect on agency operations, 
and the potential of the violations for 
causing damage to persons or property. 
Each of these factors can be used to determine whether the 
discretion of agr nry management VKM,-, abused N« - burden J ;-J placed on 
the agency. Due process principles, as Rupp points out, are based 
on the principle oi "fairness and justice" fox the parties 
in.."1 > ol v ed 
The clear interpretation of Utah Admi n Code R477-11- 1(1) , 
whic:- r<=»~—-^  * ~ *^-i ";r-"!-vr ..* .. - process" and states that these 
p . . , is that other factors of 
due process may lie applicable ' ,e factors listed are suggestions 
that enable the ager •• protect the procedural (due pr Dcess) 
f. 
Petitioner's misinterpretation of mandated burdens placed on 
the agency leads to potential ridiculous IPRU1|-,S FIT ovninpl e 
if an agency has never faced „ situation like the one foi which 
acti T w,- * . agenc> c prove consistent 
"Fairness" mandates an independent look •• n place to 
determine whether there has been an "abuse of discretion." Due 
process principles establish guidelines as to what fairness may 
include but does not create separate burdens on management to prove 
that the disciplinary action taken was fair. 
The Federal Merit System Protection Board, the federal 
equivalent of the CSRB, has addressed the issue of whether 
"principles" of the merit system independently create a cause of 
action. In Neal v. Department of Health and Human Serv., 46 
M.S.P.R. 26 (1990), the Board stated: 
The merit systems principles are intended to 
furnish guidance to Federal agencies and do 
not constitute an independent basis for legal 
action . . . . 
46 M.S.P.R. at 28. 
Just as in the federal system, principles established by the 
Department of Human Resource Management under Utah Admin. Code 
R477-ll.l(l) do not create separate causes of action or burdens to 
be placed on the agency in establishing its case. Instead, they 
provide guidance in determinations of fairness if raised by the 
appropriate party. When there are allegations that due process has 
not been provided, the burden of establishing such a denial does 
not fall on the agency alleged to have violated the doctrine, but 
the person claiming the violation. Counsel has found no 
jurisdiction that requires an affirmative showing that due process 
was followed in every particular as part of a case proper. 
As stated previously, agencies have no obligation to prove a 
negative in a hearing setting. Agency management is to follow 
principles of fairness in its determinations, but there is no 
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statute, rule or procedure that elevates these principles to 
separate elements on which the disciplining agency bears the burden 
of proof. Challenges to the rules, procedures or fairness of 
discipline imposed fall squarely on the one making the challenge. 
Utah Code Ann. § 67-19-18(5) and Utah Admin. Code R477-11-2 
require that an employee be notified in writing of the grounds for 
contemplated disciplinary action, be given an opportunity to be 
heard and respond, and then, if the "agency head finds adequate 
cause or reason," the employee may be demoted or dismissed as the 
circumstances warrant. Thus, the issue boils down to whether, 
given the circumstances, the department head has found "adequate 
cause" or "reason" for the demotion. If so, then the action shall 
be sustained absent a showing that the action was an abuse of 
discretion. It cannot seriously be argued that management must 
establish what it did, then turn around and prove that it did not 
act in an abusive manner. 
Statutes, rules and court decisions acknowledge a presumption 
of correctness of agency action, including imposition of 
discipline. To shift the burden of proof to the party who is 
presumptively correct is procedurally incorrect and error. 
The Colorado Court of Appeals in Fedder v. McCurdy, 768 P.2d 
711 (Colo. App. 1988), so held when it stated "[t]he burden is on 
the individual challenging the action to overcome the presumption 
that the agency's acts were proper." Id. at 713 (citation 
omitted). Previously, the Colorado Supreme Court held in People v. 
Galleaos, 692 P.2d 1074, 1078 (Colo. 1984), that: 
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Traditionally, a presumption of regularity 
attaches to administrative acts. . . . In 
civil cases, a presumption operates to place 
upon the adverse party the burden of producing 
evidence sufficient to rebut the presumption, 
while retaining the burden of persuasion where 
it originally lay. 
Accord Thornton v. Comm'r of Dep't of Labor & Industry, 621 P.2d 
1062, 1064-65 (Mont. 1980) (fl[t]here exists a rebuttable 
presumption in favor of the decision of the agency, and the burden 
of proof is on the party attacking it to show that it is 
erroneous"). 
If, as Despain states, the discipline shall be sustained 
absent a showing of abuse of discretion or lack of reasonableness 
or rationality, the agency simply needs to establish that there is 
a connection between the discipline and the willful misconduct. 
The burden then shifts to the one challenging that claim to 
establish that the actions were not reasonable. If evidence is: 
brought forward by the person claiming an abuse of discretion, as 
noted in Gallecros, the burden shifts back to the agency to counter, 
through rebuttal evidence, that the evidence presented by the 
employee was not credible or does not overcome the presumption of 
correctness. 
As noted, Petitioner offered no evidence as to inconsistency 
of application of discipline, an issue he claims is grounds to 
vacate the disciplinary action. With no evidence of inconsistent 
application or violation of due process, it would be error for this 
court to reverse an otherwise appropriate disciplinary action. 
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This Court has addressed a similar issue in Pickett v. Utah 
Dep't of Commerce, 858 P.2d 187 (Utah App. 1993). The Utah 
Administrative Procedures Act permits judicial review for possible 
reversal of an agency action is if the action is 
contrary to the agency's prior practice, 
unless the agency justifies the inconsistency 
by giving facts and reasons that demonstrate a 
fair and rational basis for inconsistency. 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16(4)(h)(iii). 
This provision, the Pickett court declared, did not place an 
affirmative obligation on the agency to establish consistency as 
part of its case proper. 858 P.2d at 191. The person claiming 
that inconsistency with prior practice justified reversal of agency 
action has the burden of establishing that inconsistency, as well 
as its prejudicial impact. This Court said: 
We agree with Justice Durham's analysis that 
this section requires a petitioner to 
establish as a prima facie case that the 
administrative agency's action in his or her 
case was "contrary to the agency's prior 
practice." If a petitioner meets this burden, 
section 16 (4) (h) (iii) unambiguously requires 
that "the agency justif[y] the inconsistency" 
with prior decisions. Therefore 
establishing this prima facie case by a 
preponderance of the evidence shifts the 
burden to the agency to "demonstrate a fair 
and rational" basis for the departure from 
precedent in the instant case. If the agency 
sets forth its rationale for deviation from 
its own precedent or an explanation to 
demonstrate consistency, our review of the 
explanation will be on the basis of 
"reasonableness and rationality." Appellate 
review of the penalty itself, other than as 
affected by prior agency actions, is limited 
to determining if the agency has abused the 
discretion granted it to impose sanctions. 
858 P.2d at 191. 
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The reasoning of the Utah Supreme court in Hotel Utah Co. v. 
Industrial Comm'n, 211 P.2d 200 (Utah 1949), clearly supports the 
Pickett holding. In Hotel Utah, the Industrial Commission had 
exercised its discretion in determining which party would be the 
appropriate collective bargaining unit in a labor dispute. The 
Court stated: 
If the discretion so granted is reasonably 
exercised, the finding cannot be set aside. 
It is only in those cases wherein we can find 
the Board has abused its discretion that we 
may interfere, And if appellant seeks to 
reverse the finding of the Board because of an 
abuse of discretion in selecting the 
appropriate unit the burden is on it to 
establish the abuse. 
211 P.2d at 203. Accord Farrell v. City of Seattle, 452 P.2d 965, 
967 (Wash. 1969) (ff[0]ne who asserts that a public authority has 
abused its discretion and is guilty of arbitrary, capricious, and 
unreasoning conduct has the burden of proof."). 
Here, the hearing officer determined insubordination had been 
proven and that the discipline selected was reasonable. The CSRB 
found the hearing officer was in error to require the agency to 
produce evidence it did not have the burden to produce. That was 
and is consistent with what this court and other courts have held: 
the burden falls on the one claiming abuse of discretion to produce 
evidence of the abuse. That was not done by Petitioner in this 
case. The CSRB's decision is therefore correct and must be 
sustained. 
Because the hearing officer was in error to order evidence of 
consistency and because the CSRB corrected that error and held that 
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Petitioner had presented nothing to establish inconsistency, it is 
not necessary to address Petitioner's third argument. While 
Respondents believe that testimony given by Gene Sturzenegger, 
District Director involved with Petitioner's case (R.18-19), was 
sufficient to show consistency within Petitioner's district as to 
how insubordination cases were handled, there was no requirement on 
the agency to present such information and, therefore, it will not 
be discussed further. 
POINT II 
THE REOPENING OF THE HEARING PROCESS WAS NOT 
HARMFUL ERROR. PETITIONER HAS FAILED TO 
ESTABLISH THAT THE DISCIPLINE IMPOSED WOULD 
HAVE BEEN DIFFERENT. 
Petitioner argues that the hearing officer erred in reopening 
the proceedings and requiring further evidence to be submitted for 
use in his deliberations. Respondents are unaware of any rule 
specifically addressing the hearing officer's authority to reopen 
matters. Petitioner cites Utah Admin. Code R137-1-20.E as support 
for his argument. A close reading of the rule does not address the 
hearing officer's right to exercise his discretion for the fairness 
of the proceedings. 
Respondents therefore assert that, for Petitioner to prevail, 
he must establish that the hearing officer not only abused his 
discretion by reopening the proceedings but also that the reopening 
resulted in "substantial prejudice" within Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-
16(4) (1993) . 
Petitioner has failed in both respects. In particular, he has 
failed to establish that there is a reasonable likelihood that the 
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reopening materially affected the outcome of the CSRB proceeding. 
See Morton Int'l Inc. v. Utah State Tax Comm'n, 814 P.2d 581, 584 
(Utah 1991). If error was committed by the hearing officer, it is 
Petitioner's obligation to convince this Court that the error 
affected the discipline imposed to the extent that there is a 
reasonable likelihood the discipline would have been different 
absent any abuse of discretion by the hearing officer. 
Petitioner does not challenge the fact that he engaged in 
insubordinate conduct, which the hearing officer held justified 
discipline. Petitioner produced no evidence to show that the 
punishment was inherently unfair or an abuse of discretion. 
Petitioner's sole argument is that no discipline at all should be 
imposed regardless of the determination by the hearing officer that 
discipline is appropriate. Such an assertion, absent a showing 
that the discipline rendered was an abuse of discretion, is not 
supported by anything Petitioner is presenting to this Court. 
The Utah Supreme Court adopted the harmless error standard for 
review of administrative decisions. The Court stated in Morton: 
Indeed, the language of section 63-46b-16(4) 
is similar to language in rules of procedure 
and evidence dealing with harmless error. 
Given this similarity in language, we conclude 
that the legislature in enacting section 63-
46b-16(4) intended that the same standard used 
for determining the harmfulness of error in 
appeals from judicial proceedings should apply 
to reviews of agency actions. Under this 
standard, an error will be harmless if it is 
"sufficiently inconsequential that . . . there 
is no reasonable likelihood that the error 
affected the outcome of the proceedings." 
814 P.2d at 584. 
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This purported "error," if error it was, does not 
automatically justify the removal of all discipline - only that 
which can be interpreted to be arbitrary or unreasonable would be 
subject to judicial modification. 
The hearing officer nowhere held that the demotion was either 
an abuse of discretion; or excessive. To hold that the hearing 
officer made such a finding manufactures something that never 
happened and strains logic. 
In his Final Decision, the hearing officer stated: 
"Therefore, it was for Lunnen's benefit that further proof of 
consistency was required" (R.26-7) (emphasis added). Further proof 
assumes the existence of some proof to begin with. Nonetheless, to 
simply argue, as Petitioner does, that a rule violation of 
reopening the matter somehow changed the outcome does not establish 
harm. The hearing officer himself stated, as cited above, that the 
only reason he requested additional information was "for Lunnen's 
benefit." The only way it could have been for Petitioner's benefit 
was if it had shown that prior circumstances justified a 
modification. Since the information supplied didn't benefit him, 
it made no difference to the outcome of the discipline imposed. 
Independently, the discipline was proper and sustainable 
without the reopening of the matter to accept additional 
information. The Petitioner has failed to show that there was any 
reasonable likelihood that the outcome would have been different. 
Demotion was proper. The error, if error it was, had no effect on 
the outcome of the CSRB proceeding. 
19 
CONCLUSION 
Agency management has the right to discipline employees if it 
is determined there is cause. The hearing officer established 
through an independent hearing process that there was cause 
insubordination - in Petitioner's willful refusal to respond to an 
order to report for duty. Petitioner does not challenge that 
conclusion. 
Once "cause" is established, the discipline chosen by the 
agency must be upheld unless the agency abused its discretion or 
the discipline was so unreasonable or irrational as to require a 
modification. The burden of establishing abuse of discretion falls 
on the party claiming the abuse. 
In conclusion, a party claiming that error necessitates the 
reversal or modification of a decision has the burden on appeal to 
show that the error, if error there was, was harmful in the sense' 
that, but for the error, there is a substantial likelihood that the 
outcome of the administrative proceeding would have been different. 
This Petitioner has failed to do. 
Respondents urge the Court to affirm the decision of the CSRB 
upholding the demotion imposed by the Department of Transportation. 
Counsel for Respondents 
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ADDENDUM A 
Hearing Officer's Interim Order, Lunnen v. Utah Department 
of Transportation, 11 CSRB/H.O. 154, January 5, 1993 
BEFORE THE CAREER SERVICE REVIEW BOARD OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
In The Matter Of: 
JAMES M. LUNNEN, 
Grievant, 
v. 
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF 
TRANSPORTATION 
Agency. 
FINDINGS OF FACT, 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
AND INTERIM ORDER 
WITH CONTINUING 
JURISDICTION 
Case No. CSRB/H.O. 154 
AUTHORITY 
In compliance with Utah Code Annotated §67-19a-406, an administrative hearing at 
Step 5 was held on Tuesday, November 10,1992. James M. Lunnen (Grievant) was present 
and represented by Thomas R. Bielen, Utah Public Employees' Association; the Utah 
Department of Transportation (D»epartment) was represented by Grant S. Fairbanks, Human 
Resource Manager. A court reporter made a verbatim record of the proceedings; testimony 
and documentary evidence were received into the record. Witnesses were placed under 
oath. This Hearing Officer (Presiding Officer, Utah Code Annotated, §63-46b-2(l)(h)) now 
makes and enters the following: 
STIPULATED FACTS 
The parties, by and through their representatives, stipulated and agreed that the 
following facts shall be deemed conclusively admitted as to all parties: 
1. Mr. Lunnen was hired by the Utah Department of Transportation as a 
probationary employee, Schedule "B," on March 6,1978. 
2. On September 21, 1985, Grievant was promoted to a Highway Operations 
Specialist, Grade 17. 
3. On April 1, 1989, Grievant was promoted to a Highway Operations Specialist, 
Grade 19. 
4. The Job Specification for a Highway Operations Specialist, Grade 19, indicates 
that the incumbent may be subject to 24 hour call-out. 
5. Because of Grievant's assignment, he received a pager approximately the same 
time that he was promoted to a Highway Operations Specialist, Grade 19. 
6. On April 2,1992, Grievant was called to a meeting. Present at the meeting were: 
Mr. Lunnen; Ron Smith, Area Supervisor; Paul Crossland, Supervisor; and Gloria Hunt, 
District Administrative Coordinator. 
7. On June 22,1992, Grievant was given a warning notice dated June 16,1992, which 
indicated a problem with not responding to a call-out. 
8. On July 7, 1992, a memo was sent to Eugene Findlay, Executive Director of the 
Utah Department of Transportation, by Gene Sturzenegger, District 2 Director, requesting 
that Grievant be demoted to a Highway Operations Specialist, Grade 17, and be given an 
11% reduction in salary. 
9. On July 13,1992, Mr. Findlay sent a memo to Grievant that informed him that 
he would be demoted. 
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10. The Grievant appealed this proposed demotion. 
11. Mr. Findlay appointed Howard Richardson, Deputy Director, to hear the appeal. 
Mr. Richardson was assisted by Lester Jester, Engineer for Maintenance; Heber Vlam, 
Engineer for Standards and Special Studies; and Grant Fairbanks, Human Resource 
Director. 
12. A hearing was held on August 3,1992, regarding the proposed demotion. 
13. As a result of the aforementioned hearing, the Department board recommended 
that a demotion from Grade 19 to Grade 17 with a 2.75% reduction in pay be assessed. 
14. On August 10,1992, Mr. Findlay sent a memo to Grievant which indicated that 
Lunnen would be demoted to a Highway Operations Specialist, Grade 17, effective 
August 15,1992. 
15. Mr. Luimen was demoted to Grade 17 and given a salary reduction to $11.62 
effective August 15,1992. 
16. Mr. Lunnen appealed this aforementioned demotion to the fifth step of the 
grievance process. 
17. Joint Exhibit 1, a UDOT Performance Review of Lunnen, for the period 7/1/90 
- 6/30/91 evidences an "S/U" rating, which is a cross between "successful" and 
"unsuccessful" in the "24-Hour Call" objective. Paul Crossland wrote of Lunnen: 
•Sometime [sic] hard to get a hold of for snow removal at night." 
18. Joint Exhibit 2, a UDOT Performance Review of Lunnen, for the period 7/1/91 
- 6/30/92, evidences an unsatisfactory rating on the '24-Hour Call" objective. Crossland 
wrote of Lunnen that Lunnen •may be" subject to 24 hour call-out. Crossland thanked 
-3-
Lunnen for installing a phone in his residence. Testimony relevant to this exhibit stated that 
Crossland was reinforcing the 24 hour call-out provision in Lunnenf s job duties. Crossland 
also wanted to reinforce the fact that a phone was a requirement of the job. 
19. Joint Exhibit 3, a UDOT Warning Notice to Lunnen, dated June 16, 1992, and 
signed by both Lunnen and Crossland, states that Lunnen did not respond to an emergency 
call-out and upon a subsequent attempt to telephonically contact Lunnen, an answering 
machine informed the dispatcher that the Lunnens were not at home. The exhibit further 
states that a demotion for Lunnen will be recommended to the Executive Director. 
20. Joint Exhibit 5, a memorandum from Gene Sturzenegger to Gene Findlay, 
UDOT Executive Director, details Lunnen fs history regarding 24 hour call-outs and 
recommends a demotion. 
21. Joint Exhibit 4 is a class specification of the Utah Department of Human 
Resource Management (DHRM) for Lunnen • s position. The class specification states that 
the employeef s working conditions: 
may be subject to 24 hour call; may be required to have access 
to an operating telephone or equivalent method of contact in 
case of emergency. 
22. Agency Exhibit 1, as testified to by Crossland, is a record of the after hours call-
outs made to Lunnen and others on his crew between January 1,1992, and June 21, 1992. 
The exhibit shows that Lunnen responded to after hour calls 3 of 14 times. This is a 20% 
response rate. The next lowest response was 40%, according to Crossland. 
23. Based upon the low response to call-outs by Lunnen, Crossland called Lunnen 
into a meeting on April 2,1992. Lunnen was informed that disciplinary action would follow 
if he did not improve his response to call-outs. The basis for the needed improvement, 
according to Crossland, was that a *no show* placed crew members at risk because they 
had to work longer hours to remove snow. That, coupled with bad weather and fatigue 
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which they experienced while working longer hours, placed them in danger. 
24. Crossland stated that there was no criteria nor policy determinative of what 
percentage of call-outs each crew member was required to adhere to. 
25. During the eight months Lunnen was without a phone, a pager had been 
provided to him. Lunnen and Crossland had a code devised which informed Lunnen if he 
should merely call in or or whether he should show up at the station in response to the 
page. Lunnen stated that several times he checked the pager and it appeared not to be in 
working order. Each report of an inoperable pager was responded to by repairing the pager 
by the end of the shift. 
26. On June 12, 1992, a tape was made of the call by dispatch to the Lunnen 
residence. The tape was played for this hearing officer and is a part of the record, although 
not a part of the transcript due to the multiple voices on the tape. The dispatcher called 
while Lunnen and a friend were watching a televised basketball game at approximately 
10:00 p.m. The dispatcher informed Lunnen that there had been a concrete buckle on 
1-215. Lunnen responded •ok". Approximately one-half hour later, a dispatcher again 
called the Lunnen residence and a machine answered the phone. Lunnen did not respond 
to the emergency. 
27. Lunnen and his wife testified that it is common among the crew members to call 
each other during televised sporting events and pretend there has been a call-out. Lunnen 
and his wife have both participated in these pranks. Lunnen believed the call of June 12, 
1992, to be such a prank, but he could not verify it because other pranksters were not 
answering their phone when Lunnen tried to call them. 
28. It was this failure to respond to the June 12,1992 call-out that led to Lunnen• s 
demotion. 
29. But for the call-out situation at issue, Lunnen was a satisfactory employee who 
had been recommended for a promotion from Grade 17 to Grade 19, by Crossland, due to 
his ability and hard work. Lunnen has worked at UDOT since 1978 and has no other 
disciplinary record. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. State of Utah, DHRM R477-11-2 states that an employee may be demoted for 
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cause as listed in R477-10-2 and R477-1M of the rules. 
2. R477-10-2 governs corrective actions. Pursuant to this rule, which governs conduct 
other than "willful misconduct,' corrective action shall consist of one or more of a number 
of actions, pursuant to a written plan, 
3. R477-11-1 governs disciplinary actions. Disciplinary action may be instituted for, 
among other reasons, insubordination or disloyalty to the orders of a superior. The type and 
severity of the discipline shall be governed by due process as defined in R477-11-1.(1) 
through R477-ll-l.(l)(e). 
DISCUSSION 
The first issue in dispute is whether or not the Agency can demote Lunnen without first 
implementing corrective action pursuant to R477-10-2. 
In this case there is a history of satisfactory job performance, except in the goal, 
•objective", of 24-hour call-outs. As to that objective, Lunnen has received notice through 
two annual evaluations and a meeting on April 12, 1992, that he needed improvement in 
that objective. That is, Lunnen needed to show up when he was called out for after-hour 
emergency situations. 
To assist Lunnen fs meeting the objective, the Agency provided him with a pager when 
he could not afford to pay for a phone in his home — a period of eight months. Lunnenf s 
supervisor went to Lunnen *s house to pick him up on more than one occasion when there 
was a heavy snowfall that needed emergency clearing and Lunnen had no phone. This 
Hearing Officer believes these pick ups were to assist Lunnen, not to punish or embarrass 
him. 
The unsatisfactory performance of the 24-hour call-out objective did not impede 
Lunnen1 s promotion based upon an overall satisfactory performance. The person who 
recommended that Lunnen be promoted was the same person who had issued him a pager, 
picked him up, gave him time to install a phone, and evaluated Lunnen annually, 
Paul Grassland. 
Can a corrective action plan merely consist of only verbal notice to respond to an 
objective, or an annual evaluation comment which may or may not be clear to the employee, 
or a meeting which informs the employee that there is a problem? In this case, the 
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employee was given notice by each of the above means that there was a problem. The 
solution was to pick him up when he was needed; then a pager was used to contact him; 
then, finally a phone was required to be installed. Each of the above was a means to 
remedy a problem. The problem — not being as responsive as management wanted — was 
communicated in writing at least twice. 
I have discussed the Corrective Action Plan rule because Lunnen made it a key part 
of his defense that he was not given a written Corrective Action Plan as called for in the 
rule. However, the rule regarding corrective actions is not an exclusive remedy when 
"willful misconduct" exists. In this case, demotion resulted due to one incident which 
occurred on June 12,1992. The appropriate rule to apply is R477-11-1, Disciplinary Action. 
(See Grievant Exhibit 2.) This rule applies in cases of".. .insubordination, disloyalty to the 
orders of a superior, misfeasance, malfeasance, " 
In this case, Lunnen received a phone call from the dispatcher informing him of an 
emergency situation and that he was requested to respond. Lunnen was at home and 
personally received the call. He gave absolutely no indication that he could not or would 
not respond to the call. He was watching a basketball game with a friend. Lunnen• s failure 
to respond is based upon his claim that he thought it was a prank call. Grievant and his 
wife both testified that they and Grievant1 s co-workers call each other during televised 
sporting events and, as a prank, act as if they are calling from work and request that the 
called party report to work. Lunnen believes this is an intervening event that does exculpate 
him. Lunnen did not verify with anyone at work that the call was not legitimate. Lunnen 
cannot validate his failure to respond by putting up a defense that is of his own creation. 
His non-response is not based upon legitimate grounds, but upon a reason that should not 
exist because it has the ability to harm someone or cause someone injury if the result is as 
in this case. 
Is Lunnen subject to discipline for not responding to a direct order? The appropriate 
answer is only if he was insubordinate or disobeyed orders of a superior or was misfeasant 
or malfeasant is he then subject to demotion as a discipline, as stated in R477-11-2, which 
is based upon and recites Utah Code Annotated (UCA), §67-19-18(1). There is no doubt 
Grievant disobeyed the orders of a superior. Disobedience to the orders of a superior is 
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insubordination. The act is also malfeasance and misfeasance in that Lunnen did not do 
something he should have done and/or did it wrongfully. No matter how we characterize 
the act, it meets the requirement for discipline. 
Hie severity of the discipline is governed by R477-ll-l.(l). Discipline must take into 
consideration: consistency of application, prior knowledge of the standards, notice of 
noncompliance, determination of facts and opportunity to respond. Lunnen had prior 
knowledge that there was a problem with his not responding to the call-outs. Grievant 
received notice by way of annual evaluations, verbal notification and by meetings. Lunnen 
has been given the opportunity to respond to the allegation of insubordination. The 
remaining issue is whether or not the demotion is consistent with other employees1 
disciplinary penalties for insubordination. 
The Agency offered one instance of insubordination and a commensurate demotion as 
proof of consistency of application. Taking into account the long and valued work 
performance of Lunnen, it does not appear that a demotion for this act is consistent with 
prior discipline imposed by the Agency. There is no dispute that Lunnen knew about the 
call-out policy of 24-hours and that he knew he was subject to it; but, there is no proof that 
it is a mandatory policy nor that anyone else has been disciplined for not responding to the 
call-out, except the one incident mentioned above. There is substantial evidence from both 
sides that any excuse for not responding was accepted as being valid. In this case, Lunnen 
had no excuse. 
Pursuant to UCA, §67-19a-406, the Agency has the burden of proof in cases of 
demotion. The Agency has not provided any proof that the demotion of Lunnen is 
consistent with prior discipline for one act of insubordination. It would be difficult and 
probably inequitable to both parties for this Hearing Officer to ratify some random 
discipline. Therefore, Lunnen will continue in his present status for twenty working days 
from receipt of this decision. During this time, the Agency shall submit the best evidence 
they have regarding the discipline they imposed on others for a similar first insubordination 
finding. If there is no consistency in application of discipline, this Hearing Officer will select 
the most common or equitable discipline. The Agency should be aware that if demotion 




This Hearing Officer finds that the Agency had the authority to discipline Lunnen and 
that Lunnen was insubordinate by his failure to obey the order of a superior pursuant to 
Lunnenf s prior knowledge that he was subject to a 24-hour call-out. The discipline imposed 
shall be held in abeyance pending proof by the Agency that it is consistent with other 
similarly situated employees. Thte Agency shall submit to this Hearing Officer, through the 
Administrator of the Career Service Review Board, its best proof of what discipline is 
consistently given to employees of the Agency for a first time insubordination, i.e., failure 
to obey the order of a supervisor. This Hearing Officer shall then ratify the Grievant' s 
appropriate discipline. If there is no consistent discipline, this Hearing Officer shall select 
the most appropriate one from those disciplines most regularly imposed. Any adjustment 
to Lunnen1 s grade and pay shall be adjusted when the discipline is imposed. 
Pending modification or validation of the discipline, the record shall remain open. This 
hearing and its record shall remain open for purposes of appeal by Grievant until the 
discipline is imposed and the time for appeal shall commence subsequent to a modification 
of this Order which imposes the discipline. Copies of all submittals to this Hearing Officer 
shall be provided to Grievant. 
DATED this 5th day of January 1993. 
Michael N. Martinez 
Hearing Officer/Presiding Officer 
Career Service Review Board 
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ADDENDUM B 
Hearing Officer's Final Order and Decision, Lunnen v. Utah 
Department of Transportation, 11 CSRB/H.O. 154, March 15, 1993 
MAR t 7 1993 
OSos Of ATTORNEY (aENcRAL 
236 STATE CAPiTOL 
BEFORE THE CAREER SERVICE REVIEW BOARD OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
In The Matter Of: : 
JAMES M. LUNNEN, : FINAL ORDER 
Grievant, : AND DECISION TO 
v. : STEP 5 PROCEEDINGS 
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF : 
TRANSPORTATION, : 
Agency. : Case No. CSRB/H.O. 154 
AUTHORITY 
Pursuant to the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Interim Order With 
Continuing Jurisdiction issued by this Hearing Officer on January 5, 1993, and to 
R137-1-20 A., which states that a Hearing Officer may require evidence be produced, 
separate and apart from that received in a hearing, as governed by R137-1-20 B., this Final 
Order issues. 
Also, pursuant to R137-1-20 J., the CSRB Hearing Officer may, after finding 
sufficient cause for sustaining disciplinary action by an agency, provide for a remedy or relief 
"as deemed appropriate and in the best interest of the respective parties." 
In this case the Hearing Officer found, and so held in his Interim Order, that the 
Agency had just cause to discipline Grievant for insubordination. The remaining issue to 
be decided then was the degree of severity of the disciplinary penalty, since neither party 
had argued the issues of severity, consistency or latitude of discipline. Therefore, pursuant 
to R137-1-20 J., this Hearing Officer issued his Interim Order, which included both Findings 
of Fact and Conclusions of Law, but which delayed any finding on severity of Agencyf s 
action pending further submission by the parties and in the best interests of the respective 
parties. 
Since the issuance of the Interim Order, Mr. Lunnen, Grievant, has objected to the 
submission of further evidence to this Hearing Officer. See Lunnen Memorandums dated 
January 13,1993, and February 3,1993. The Agency submitted its requested documentation 
on January 25,1993. Grievant • s main objection is that this Hearing Officer was prohibited 
from accepting or requiring further evidence in this case once the hearing day was over. 
Pursuant to the above citations, Hearing Officers are given wide latitude in seeking to do 
justice to the respective parties. In this specific case, Mr. Lunnen filed a Request For 
Reconsideration, which basically stated that the Agency did not meet its burden of proof; 
therefore, the supplemental information could not be introduced. What Mr. Lunnen did not 
address in his Motion is that the Interim Order issued states emphatically that Mr. Lunnen 
was insubordinate, on that issue the Agency fully met its burden. Therefore, the 
supplemental evidence sought, which as noted in the Interim Order that the record would 
remain open, was not further testimony or argument but rather proof of consistent 
discipline. The only information sought by the Hearing Officer was, "What is the 
appropriate punishment for insubordination at UDOT?" 
Mr. Lunnen argues in his Motion For Reconsideration that the Agency did not prove 
a demotion was consistent discipline for one act of insubordination. That is true. However, 
this does not invalidate the finding that Lunnen was, without doubt and by substantial proof, 
insubordinate and the only evidence received was that the reduction in grade was what the 
Agency thought was just and consistent with prior discipline. Therefore, it was for Lunnenf s 
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benefit that further proof of consistency was required. Lunnen further argues, in his second 
Memorandum, that this Hearing Officer is barred by the "residuum rule" as stated in the 
case of Tolman v. Salt Lake County\ which bars "all hearsay and other legally inadmissible 
evidence." What Mr. Lunnen is saying is that the Agency ' s subsequent submissions are 
hearsay and/or legally inadmissible. What the court in Tolman was referring to was due 
process. Do the parties have die ability to confront and examine the witnesses against 
them? In this case there has been no objection to the evidence introduced and accepted 
at the hearing. The subsequent submissions were provided to both parties. No objection 
to the materials provided has been made by Mr. Lunnen; he has argued against their being 
received, but receipt of these documents has only been to assist in the provision of an 
appropriate remedy, not to assist in the determination of guilt or innocence. This specific 
bifurcation is allowed by R137-1-20 J. 
Does the above rule allow for subsequent information to be received? The Hearing 
Officer may provide for "other relief as deemed appropriate and in the best interest of the 
respective parties," through the receipt of information pursuant to R137-1-20 A. so long as 
each party's due process is protected. In this case the parties each had full opportunity to 
provide subsequent information dealing with consistent discipline for the behavior found to 
be insubordinate and to further contest the information provided. 
As an exhibit to his final Memorandum, Mr. Lunnen attached a copy of the Parker 
v. Utafi Department of Corrections, 5 CSRB 42, (Step 6) issued 28 January 1993. Although 
issued after the hearing of the above parties, it does have some clarification useful to this 
case. The Parker Order cites R137-1-20 J. at page 5. In its discussion of the rule the Career 
Service Review Board states that the determination of whether "discipline as excessive, 
disproportionate or otherwise constitutes an abuse of discretion" is inherent in the process 
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of rendering a decision. The Hearing Officer must give latitude and consideration to an 
agency's decision when supported factually. 
Parker does not state that a case cannot be bifurcated nor evidence received on the 
narrow issue of consistency of discipline nor as a basis to give latitude and consideration to 
an agency ' s discipline. What Parker does say is that whatever method of evidence gathering 
is used, when permissible, it must be fair to both parties. In this case, the latitude given to 
the Agency, as well as the consistency of imposing demotion, were not adequately addressed 
at the hearing by either part}'; therefore, fairness to both sides dictated further 
documentation to the issue. This in no way impinges on the finding that Mr. Lunnen was 
insubordinate. The supplemental issue only pertained to his demotion. 
The reason for the supplemental information was to be fair and not have the Hearing 
Officer ratify a discipline inconsistent with prior Agency imposition with the possibility of 
being overly harsh on the Grievant. 
DECISION AND ORDER 
Based upon the information submitted by the Agency pursuant to the Interim Order 
and Grievant • s failure to contest either the sufficiency or veracity of that information as 
well as both the consistency and severity of the Agency's use of demotion as a discipline 
when employees have been insubordinate, it is hereby held that the Agencyf s discipline was 
neither excessive, disproportionate nor an abuse of discretion. Therefore, Mr. Lunnen • s 
grievance remedy seeking a lesser discipline is denied and the Agency • s discipline is upheld. 
Additionally, Grievant fs Motion For Reconsideration, although untimely, has been 
considered and discussed above, and is also denied. 
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DATED this / o day of March 1993. 
Michael N. Martinez <^7 
CSRB Hearing Officer 
RECONSIDERATION 
Any request for reconsideration must be filed in writing with the Career Service Review Board within ten 
working days upon receipt of this decision. (Utah Administrative Code, R137-1-20 M.) 
APPEAL 
Any appeal of this decision must be filed in writing with the Career Service Review Board within ten working 
days upon receipt of this decision. (UtaJt Code Unannotated (1993 Supp.), §67-19a-407(l)(a)(i).) 
ADDENDUM C 
Career Service Review Board's Decision and Final Agency Action 
Lunnen v. Utah Department of Transportation. 5 CSRB 46 
October 28, 1993 
BEFORE THE CAREER SERVICE REVIEW BOARD OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
In The Matter Of: 
JAMES M. LUNNEN, 
Grievant, 
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF 
TRANSPORTATION, 
Agency. 
DECISION AND FINAL 
AGENCY ACTION 
Case Nos. 5 CSRB 46 (Step 6) 
11 CSRB/H.0.154 (Step 5) 
The Career Service Review Board (Board and CSRB) conducted an appellate review 
of the above-captioned matter on August 12,1993. The following Board Members heard oral 
argument and later deliberated in the decision-making process: Chairman Bruce T. Jones, Jean 
M. Bishop, David M. Hilbig and Jose L. Trujillo. James M. Lunnen (Mr. Lunnen and 
Appellant) was not present, but was represented by Phillip W. Dyer, Attorney at Law, as 
counsel to the Utah Public Employees' Association. Assistant Attorney General Stephen G. 
Schwendiman, Office of the Attorney General, represented the Utah Department of 
Transportation (Department and UDOT). A certified court reporter from Tempest Reporting 
made a verbatim record of oral argument before the Board, which is commonly referred to as 
a Step 6 appeal hearing under the State Employees' Grievance and Appeal Procedures. 
AUTHORITY 
The CSRB's statutory provisions are set forth at §§67-19a-101 through -408 of the Utah 
Code Unannotated (1993 Supp.). Effective November 2,1992, the CSRB's provisions at R137-1-
20 C and -21 D. were amended through the State's rulemaking procedures at §§63-46a et seq. 
These amended provisions are applicable to the evidentiary/Step 5 proceedings in this matter, 
which occurred on November 10 and 13,1992. 
This case proceeded properly through the State's grievance procedures, and the Board 
has assumed jurisdiction over Mr. Lunncn's appeal to Step 6. The Step 6 or Board-level review 
constitutes the final step in the administrative review under the codified Grievance and Appeal 
Procedures, according to §§67-19a-202(l)(a), -407 and -408, as well as constituting a final agency 
action under §63-46b-14 of the Utah Administrative Procedures Act (UAPA). All UAPA formal 
adjudicatory provisions are applicable to the CSRB's proceedings at both Steps 5 and 6. After 
closing the record following oral argument, the Board Members entered into an executive 
session for deliberation and decision-making. 
After considering the record as a whole and the arguments presented at the Board-level 
hearing, the Board sustains the Step 5 Decision and denies Mr. Lunnen's appeal. 
ISSUES 
A. Issues Adjudicated at Step 5 Hearing 
The following twofold issues were noticed for the evidentiaiy/Step 5 proceedings as the 
issues to be adjudicated: 
1. Was Grievant demoted for just cause? 
2. If not, what is the appropriate remedy? 
On these issues, the CSRB hearing officer ruled that just cause supported Mr. Lunnen's 
demotion, and that his penalty was neither excessive, disproportionate nor an abuse of 
discretion. 
B. Issues Presented on Appeal to Step 6 
Mr. Lunnen comes before this Board arguing three issues upon appeal to Step 6. First, 
Appellant argues that the Department failed to carry its burden of proof; therefore, his 
disciplinaiy penalty should be vacated, and that Mr. Lunnen should be reinstated to his former 
Grade 19 position and his lost pay restored. Second, Mr* Lunnen urges the Board to rule that 
its hearing: officers do not have authority to reopen the record at Step 5 proceedings once the 
record has been closed. Third, Appellant Lunnen avers that the CSRB hearing officer violated 
the following: (a) provision §63-46b-10(3) of the UAPA, (b) the residuum rule, and (c) the 
Utah Court of Appeals* holding in Tolman v. Salt Lake County Attorney, 818 ?2d 23 (Ut. App. 
1991). (Hereinafter, the Tolman case.) 
C. The Board's Appellate Standards of Review 
Effective November 2, 1992, the Board amended its standards of review provision at 
R137-1-21 D. Thus, the recently amended version of R137-1-21 D. is applicable to 
Mr. Lunnen's appeal to the Board at Step 6. The just-mentioned provision states: 
D. The Board's Standards of Review. The board's standards of 
review shall be based upon the following criteria: 
1. The board shall first make a determination of whether the 
factual findings of the CSRB hearing officer are reasonable and 
rational in accordance with the substantial evidence standard. If 
the board determines that the factual findings of the CSRB 
hearing officer are not reasonable and rational based on the 
evidentiary/step 5 record as a whole, then the board may, in its 
discretion, correct the factual findings, and/or make new or 
additional factual findings. 
2. Once the board has either determined that the factual findings 
of the CSRB hearing officer are reasonable and rational or has 
corrected the factual findings based upon the evidentiary/step 5 
record as a whole, the board must then determine whether the 
CSRB hearing officer has correctly applied the relevant policies, 
rules, and statutes in accordance with the correctness standard, 
with no deference being granted to the evidentiary/step 5 decision 
of the CSRB hearing officer. 
3. Finally, the board must determine whether the decision of the 
CSRB hearing officer, including the totality of the sanctions 
imposed by the agency, is reasonable and rational based upon the 
ultimate factual findings and correct application of relevant 
policies, rules, and statutes determined in accordance with the 
above provisions. 
The above-quoted provisions constitute the Board's standards by which this case will be 
reviewed. 
FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
A. Event Giving Rise to the Appeal 
Mr. Lunnen is a long term State career service employee. He has been employed with 
the Department continuously since being hired permanently on March 6,1978, at a Grade 15. 
The Department promoted Appellant to Highway Operations Specialist, Grade 17, effective 
September 21, 1985. Four and one-half years later (April 1, 1989), Appellant Lunnen was 
promoted to a Highway Operations Specialist, Grade 19, a lead worker position. The State's 
classification specification for an employee in Mr. Lunnen's job title stipulates under the 
category of working conditions that an incumbent: * . . . may be subject to 24 hour call; may 
JU 
be required to have access to an operating telephone or equivalent method of contact in case 
of emergency." (Jt. Exht. 4.) 
Paul Crosland, Mr. Lunnen's immediate supervisor, rated Lunnen on his FY90-91 
performance appraisal under the 24-hour call-out performance objective as borderline 
acceptable ("satisfactory/unsatisfactory"). Thus, Supervisor Crosland noted that Appellant 
Lunnen is aSometime[s] hard to get a hold of for snow removal at night," (Jt. Exht. 1). By 
rating Mr. Lunnen as borderline or "S/IT for his poor call-out response record, Mr. Crosland 
had served warning on him regarding this problem- On the following year's FY91-92 
performance appraisal, Supervisor Crosland again cautioned Mr. Lunnen about his completely 
inadequate ("unsatisfactory") emergency call-out response record under the same 24-hour call-
out objective: "I need [your] help on call out[s] (may be subject to 24 hour call). Thank you 
for getting a phone again," (Jt. Exht. 2). Supervisor Crosland had now warned Mr. Lunnen for 
two consecutive years about the latter's inadequate emergency call-out response rate. 
During early 1992, Appellant further failed in responding to emergency call-outs. 
Additionally, for more than eight months he lacked a required residential telephone (Crosland, 
T. 62; Mrs. Lunnen, 142). Mr. Lunnen blamed personal bankruptcy problems for his lack of 
a residential telephone (T. 30), even though UDOT officials had offered him assistance in 
getting his telephone re-installed (T. 30-31). As Appellant lacked a residential telephone during 
this eight month period, Department officials provided him with a pager (T. 93), so that when 
paged, Mr. Lunnen either returned calls to Supervisor Crosland or showed up at the coded 
UDOT station appearing on his pager. When Mr. Lunnen twice complained that his pager 
didn't work properly, Mr. Crosland took it to be repaired and returned it to him on the same 
day (T. 73,173). Each time the repair operator returned the pager in working condition. 
On April 2,1992, Mr. Lunnen had been directed to meet with District 2 Maintenance 
Area Supervisor Ron Smith and Station Supervisor Paul Crosland concerning his continuing 
failure in not responding to several recent after-hours call-outs (T. 57-58). Mr. Lunnen was 
informed that a disciplinary penalty would be imposed if he did not improve his call-out 
responses (T. 78). Supervisor Crosland expressed his extreme concern that Mr. Lunnen still 
lacked a telephone after more than eight months, and that Appellant was not yet responding 
to emergency call-outs as instructed. Appellant Lunnen was ordered to get a home telephone 
installed within two weeks (Jt. Exht. 5). Mr. Crosland informed Mr. Lunnen that he absolutely 
had to have a telephone as a continuing condition of his employment with UDOT. Appellant 
complied. 
Other employees on Mr. Crosland's crew had long harbored ill feelings due to Mr. 
Lunnen's many absences on call-outs (T. 86-87). Appellant Lunnen's failure to respond in 
emergency situations placed a greater burden on his fellow crew members, who had to work 
additional hours (T. 21, 87). Mr. Lunnen's continued absences caused morale problems within 
Crosland's crew. Area Maintenance Supervisor Smith observed that Lunnen's history of not 
responding to call-outs dated back to 1983 (T. 54, 63). Supervisor Crosland also testified that 
Lunnen had a long history of not responding (T. 71, 79, 87), even though he had been twice 
promoted. 
UDOT District 2 Director Gene Sturzenegger later summarized this April 2 
meeting in his subsequent July 7,1992 report: 
Mr. Lunnen was also told that if he didn't show a willingness to 
cooperate, make arrangements for a telephone and also be 
available for emergency call-outs, it would be necessary to 
recommend disciplinary action. Mr. Lunnen did arrange for a 
telephone one day after the deadline given him (Jt. Exht. 5). 
(Emphasis supplied.) 
The above paragraph's content was originally conveyed to Mr. Lunnen in verbal context 
through his supervisors (Smith and Crosland) during their April 2 meeting with him. 
Importantly, Appellant Lunnen was placed on notice through a direct, specific verbal warning 
that he faced disciplinary action if he did not respond to call-outs, and if he did not obtain a 
telephone in his home. 
Next, Mr. Lunnen received a formal Warning Notice, dated June 16,1992, from both 
Supervisor Crosland and UDOTs District 2 engineer that clearly stated Lunnen was still not 
properly responding to emergency call-outs upon being notified by telephone. The Warning 
Notice explained that Mr. Lunnen had again failed to report as directed during the evening of 
June 12,1992, regarding the following incident: 
On June 12th, Mr. Lunnen was contacted by the dispatcher and 
asked to come to work as there was an emergency blowup of the 
concrete at 1-215 and approximately 700 West. Virgil Bair was 
waiting for Mr. Lunnen to help him on the road. After a 
considerable amount of time, Mr. Bair contacted the dispatcher 
[again] and asked that Mr. Lunnen be contacted again for an 
estimated time of arrival. At that time, Mr. Bair was informed 
that their [UHP Dispatch] call to Mr. Lunnen was answered by a 
machine and that Mr. Lunnen was not available. Personnel 
Bulletins state, "employee must be willing and able to work night 
shifts'* and "may be subject to 24-hour call.* (Jt. Exht. 3.) 
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The written Warning Notice by both the District 2 engineer and Station Supervisor Crosland 
carried a recommendation that Appellant be immediately demoted for his failure to report as 
directed during the emergency call-out on June 12. 
B. Departmental Proceedings 
District 2 Director Sturzenegger supported both supervisors' June 16 written Warning 
Notice's recommended demotion of Appellant based upon his failure in responding to the 
June 12 1-215 emergency call-out. In his July 7, 1992 recommendation for Mr. Lunnen's 
demotion, Director Sturzenegger considered Appellant's explanation for not responding to the 
June 12 emergency call-out, and found his explanation lacking credibility and his conduct 
inexcusable: 
. . • Mr. Lunnen was contacted by Highway Patrol Dispatch 
because of an emergency situation on 1-215. Mr. Lunnen 
answered the initial call and agreed to come to work. When he 
did not arrive, Dispatch was asked to contact him again and their 
call was answered by a machine saying he was not available. He 
was also paged and did not answer his pager. 
When Mr. Lunnen was asked why he did not respond, he said he 
thought someone was playing a joke on him because there was 
laughing and giggling on the telephone. 
In an effort to verify his statement, arrangements were made to 
listen to the tapes from Dispatch. There was no evidence of 
laughing and giggling, only a call requesting that he respond to an 
emergency on 1-215. He agreed to respond. The second call 
[sjhows that it was answered by an answering machine. A copy of 
this tape has been retained by the District for future use. 
The just-mentioned UHP Dispatch tape was submitted to and heard by the CSRB 
hearing officer (Finding of Fact No. 26). The Dispatch tape conveys Mr. Lunnen answering 
the telephone, receiving the call-out message, and agreeing to report to work, as instructed. 
But he did not report. Mr. Lunnen fully disregarded this call-out notification. The Dispatch 
operator called again about 30-45 minutes later but no one answered Mr. Lunnen's telephone. 
The Lunnens' telephone answering machine had been turned on and a message was left. 
Mr. Lunnen and his wife testified that it was not uncommon for those on Supervisor Crosland's 
crew to call each other during off-duty time, especially during televised sporting events, and 
pretend to report an emergency call-out. Mrs. Lunnen stated that the prank calls were more 
common during winter months, than during other seasons (T. 141). According to Appellant 
Lunnen, he, his wife, and his co-workers all participated in such pranks as a means of 
attempting to hoodwink each other into going out on a false report. At the Step 5 hearing, 
Mr. Lunnen acknowledged that he did not properly respond to the June 12 emergency call-out, 
but defended his failure by laying blame on the prankster practice prevalent among Supervisor 
Crosland's crew. Mr. Lunnen's demotion was directly precipitated by his failure to report as 
directed during the June 12 evening emergency call-out on 1-215. 
On July 2,1992, UDOTs District 2 director requested via memo to the Department's 
executive director that Mr. Lunnen be demoted from Highway Operations Specialist, Grade 19 
to Grade 17, with an accompanying 11 percent salary reduction. On July 13, 1992, the 
Department's executive director notified Appellant Lunnen of his intent to demote him. 
Mr. Lunnen appealed the Department's proposed demotion. A three-member departmental 
grievance panel heard Mr. Lunnen's story and considered his appeal in an informal administra-
tive hearing. Afterwards, the three-person departmental grievance panel recommended to 
UDOTs executive director that Mr. Lunnen be demoted from Grade 19 to 17 but with an 
accompanying 2.75 percent salary reduction (a one-step reduction on the State's pay plan) 
rather than the previously proposed 11 percent. Effective August 15, 1992, Appellant was 
demoted and his pay rate decreased according to the grievance panel's recommendation. 
Mr. Lunnen property and timely appealed this disciplinary penalty through the CSRB's 
grievance procedures at Steps 5 and 6. 
C Interim Order 
The CSRB hearing officer issued his Step 5 Decision in two separate rulings. The first 
Step 5 ruling, issued on January 5, 1993, was entitled "Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law 
and Interim Order with Continuing Jurisdiction" (Interim Order). In that document, the trier 
of fact accepted the parties' joint stipulation of facts as the material factual basis of this case. 
The CSRB examiner supplemented the evidentiary record with his additional factual findings, 
and then made legal conclusions. Therein, the Interim Order assessed Mr. Lunnen's duty to 
comply with the call-out order given him by UHP Dispatch by telephone on June 12, against 
Mr. Lunnen's excuses for not complying: believing the call might be a purported telephone 
prank from one or more crew members, a family member mistakenly turning on his answering 
machine, and his pager not being activated that evening. The CSRB hearing officer considered 
the witnesses' demeanor, observed their degree of eye contact, their vocal responses along with 
tonal qualities, and weighed all testimonial and documentary evidence along with each 
witnesses' credibility. The transcript contains numerous inconsistencies when comparing 
Mr. and Mrs. Lunnens' testimony with that of the other witnesses. The trier of fact rejected 
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Mr. Lunnen's so-called prank alibi as an attempt to efface the latter's complete failure to 
comply with a valid, twice-made emergency call-out: 
Lunnen believes this is an intervening event [prank alibi] that 
does exculpate him. Lunnen did not verify with anyone at work 
that the call was not legitimate. Lunnen cannot validate his 
failure to respond by putting up a defense that is of his own 
creation. His non-response is not based upon legitimate grounds, 
but upon a reason that should not exist because it has the ability 
to harm someone or cause someone injury if the result is as in 
this case. (Interim Order, p. 7.) 
Having determined that Appellant Lunnen lacked a valid reason when he chose not to 
respond to the June 12 emergency call-out, the cvidentiaiy examiner next essayed whether 
Mr. Lunnen's behavior warranted demotion as a proper disciplinary penalty for his failure to 
respond to a directly-requested emergency call-out. 'There is no doubt [Lunnen] disobeyed 
the orders of a superior,** concluded the CSRB hearing officer (Interim Order, p. 7). 
Disobedience to the orders of a superior is insubordination. The 
act is also malfeasance and misfeasance in that Lunnen did not do 
something he should have done and/or did it wrongfully. No 
matter how we characterize the act, it meets the requirement for 
discipline. (Ibid, pp. 7-8.) 
The cvidentiaiy examiner further concluded that the Department had proper authority to 
discipline Mr. Lunnen, and that Appellant, in turn, had been insubordinate by his failure to 
obey the lawful order of a superior by taking into account Mr. Lunnen's prior knowledge that 
he was subject to 24-hour emergency call-out duty (Ibid p. 9). 
After having concluded that some form of discipline was appropriate, the Interim Order 
considered the Department's particular sanction of a demotion. Specifically, the CSRB 
examiner contemplated whether a demotion from Grade 19 to 17 with an accompanying 2.75 
percent pay loss was consistent with other UDOT employees* disciplinary penalties for a first-
time insubordination incident. Opined the CSRB examiner in his Interim Order at page 8: 
The Agency [UDOT] offered one instance of insubordination and 
a commensurate demotion as proof of consistency of application. 
Taking into account the long and valued work performance of 
Lunnen, it does not appear that a demotion for this act is 
consistent with prior discipline imposed by [UDOT]. There is no 
dispute that Lunnen knew about the call-out policy of 24-hours 
and that he knew he was subject to it; but, there is no proof that 
it is a mandatory policy nor that anyone else has been disciplined 
for not responding to the call-out, except the one incident 
mentioned above. There is substantial evidence from both sides 
that any excuse for not responding was accepted as being valid. 
In this case, Lunnen had no excuse. 
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Noting that §67-19a-406 places the burden of proof on the Department in appeals 
stemming from demotion, the CSRB hearing officer observed that UDOT "has not provided 
any proof that the demotion of Lunnen is consistent with prior discipline for one act of 
insubordination." (Ibid p. 8.) Consequently, the CSRB hearing officer ordered that Lunnen's 
demotion and pay rate decrease be held in abeyance "pending proof by the [Department] that 
it is consistent with other similarly situated employees." UDOT was directed to submit "its best 
proof of what discipline is consistently given to employees of the [Department] for a first time 
insubordination, i.e., failure to obey the order of a supervisor," (Ibid., p. 9). According to the 
Step 5 Interim Order, should the Department be able to provide proof of consistent treatment 
for first time acts of insubordination, the examiner stated that he would "then ratify [Lunnen's] 
appropriate discipline." Otherwise, if UDOT failed to show consistency of discipline for 
similarly situated employees, the trier of fact would then "select the most appropriate one from 
those disciplines most regularly imposed," with any subsequent adjustment to Lunnen's grade 
and pay being adjusted later (Ibid, p. 9). The Interim Order concluded that "the record shall 
remain open" during the period UDOT submits its supporting evidence of previous demotion 
actions. 
D. Final Order 
On March 15,1993, the CSRB examiner issued his "Final Order and Decision to Step 5 
Proceedings" (Step 5 Decision). Having previously established that UDOT had just cause to 
discipline Lunnen, the CSRB hearing officer now assessed "the degree of severity of the 
disciplinary penalty, since neither party had argued the issues of severity, consistency or latitude 
of discipline," (Step 5 Decision, p. 1). After considering a selection of UDOT case histories 
submitted pursuant to the Interim Order, regarding other previously disciplined UDOT 
employees charged with insubordination, the Step 5 Decision ultimately concluded that 
Mr. Lunnen's discipline was appropriately warranted, and was neither inconsistent nor 
excessive. 
THE DEPARTMENT AND THE BURDEN OF PROOF 
Appellant claims that the Department failed to carry its burden of proof with respect 
to the propriety of its disciplinary sanction. However, while Mr. Lunnen concedes that "UDOT 
presented substantial evidence of [his] misconduct," (Brief, p. 9), he asserts that UDOT "wholly 
failed to prove" the propriety of its demotion and salary reduction. Because our amended 
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evidentiary standard is a two-tier standard, we review R137-1-20 C. 1. and 2., and apply these 
provisions to Mr. Lunnen's factual situation. 
A. Burden of Proof - Misconduct Proved 
R137-1-20 C 1. states: 
The CSRB hearing officer shall first make factual findings based 
solely on the evidence presented at the hearing without deference 
to any prior factual findings of the agency. The CSRB hearing 
officer shall then determine whether, (a) the factual findings 
made from the evidentiary/Step 5 hearing support with substantial 
evidence the allegations made by the agency or the appointing 
authority, and (b) the agency had correctly applied relevant 
policies, rules, and statutes. 
In his Interim Order, the examiner explicitly found that: *There is no doubt Grievant 
disobeyed the orders of a superior. Disobedience to the orders of a superior is insubordina-
tion." (Ibid, pp. 7-8.) Mr. Lunnen had received written notice on two consecutive annual 
performance appraisals of his unsatisfactory call-out record. He and Supervisor Crosland had 
engaged in many conversations over the years regarding this problem (T. 78, 86). Appellant 
had met with his supervisors on April 2, and was told specifically that his ongoing failure to 
adequately respond would result in discipline unless he improved his call-out response record. 
Supervisor Crosland's records show that Mr. Lunnen responded to only three call-outs during 
the period of January 1 through June 21,1992, while he failed to respond to 11 other call-outs 
(T. 75). Appellant's response rate was only 20 percent for 3 out of 14 call-out requests in his 
crew. The next lowest response rate was 40 percent (Agency Exht. 1). Yet even after his 
supervisors' verbal warning on April 2, Lunnen did not respond on June 12, when he personally 
received a telephone call, acknowledged the UHP dispatcher's message to report, stated he 
would be responding, but for inexplicable reasons deliberately chose not to report. 
That evening Mr. Lunnen had been watching a basketball game on television when the 
call came about 10:00 p.m. The UHP Dispatch caller directed Appellant to report promptly 
to a section of ruptured concrete slab (a "blow up") emergency at 1-215 and 700 West. 
Appellant stated to the dispatcher that he would respond (aO. K."), but he did not. A half-
hour or more later, the dispatcher called again but found Mr. Lunnen's answering machine 
turned on, and no one picked up the incoming call. Dispatch also tried alerting Mr. Lunnen 
with the pager but he had not activated it. Appellants9 witnesses testified that it was District 
2 policy to report if you were at home and got called out (T. 130,134), as did Lunnen himself 
(T. 172). Moreover, Mr. Lunnen had known since his meeting with supervisors on April 2 that 
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he would be under penalty of discipline should he not improve his call-out response record 
(T. 86). 
Mr. Lunnen defended himself for the June 12 incident by claiming that he thought the 
Dispatch call had been made by fellow crew members, although none had called back to claim 
it was a prank. Both Appellant and his wife stated that with prank calls, someone always called 
shortly afterwards and identified the call as a prank (T. 171)* No one really wanted a crew 
member to go out on a false report (T. 171)- Appellant acknowledged that he had no 
reasonable basis upon which to believe that this call was anything but legitimate, and not bogus. 
Importantly, Mr. Lunnen had given no indication that he would not be responding nor did he 
verify with anyone at UDOT or UHP Dispatch that the call was not valid. Quite the opposite, 
Appellant stated that he would be responding that evening- Substantial evidence shows that 
Mr. Lunnen committed insubordination through his misconduct when he refused his 
supervisors' standing orders to respond to emergency call-outs when contacted, unless not in 
a condition or circumstance to respond. 
UDOT effectively marshalled the evidence against Mr. Lunnen's wrongdoing at the 
evidentiary proceeding below. Even Appellant acknowledges such in his Brief at page 9: 
uAdmittedly, UDOT presented substantial evidence of [Appellant's] misconduct " After 
hearing the evidence, the CSRB examiner then determined that under R137-1-20 G 1., 
substantial evidence supported the Department's allegations of insubordination and misconduct 
as described in the executive director's July 13 and August 10 disciplinary action letters. We 
conclude that the evidentiary examiner made accurate factual findings, which were reasonable 
and rational based upon the record as a whole, as required by R137-1-20 G 1. 
Next, the hearing officer complied with R137-1-20 C 2., when he determined that 
Appellant's disciplinary sanction of a demotion and a one-step pay rate decrease was not 
excessive, disproportionate or abusive. 
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U, Burden of Proof - Penal tj 
Appellant Lunnen argues that UDOT tailed to meet u >. Uirrirn nt prnnf no 1 bm inp ihr 
propriety of a two-grade demotion coupled with a pay raft reduction " First, the codiIIIm ill 
grievance and appeal procedures place upon an agency the burden of proof in all disciplinary 
grievances, including demotions (§67-19a-406(2)(a))» Then the evidentiaiy examiner properly 
applied the Board's provision at R137-1-20 C 2., which states: 
When the CSRB hearing officer determines in accordance with 
the procedures set forth above that the evidentiary step 5 factual 
findings support the allegations of the agency or the appointing 
authority, then the CSRB hearing officer must determine whether 
the agency's decision, including any disciplinary sanctions im-
posed, is excessive, disproportionate or otherwise constitutes an 
abuse of discretion. In making this latter determination, the 
CSRB hearing officer shall give deference to the decision of the 
agency or the appointing authority unless the agency's penalty is 
determined to be excessive, disproportionate or constitutes an 
abuse of discretion in which instance the CSRB hearing officer 
shall determine the appropriate remedy. 
Mr. Lunnen has misread or misunderstood the examiner's Step 5 Decision with respect 
to the following portion that is quoted in Appellant's Brief at page 2: 
Mr. Lunnen argues in his Motion For Reconsideration that the 
Agency did not prove a demotion was consistent discipline for one 
act of insubordination. That is true. 
But, importantly, continued the hearing officer, in the immediately following s : i it : I i :es: 
However, this does not invalidate the finding that Lunnen was, 
without doubt and by substantial proof, insubordinate and the 
only evidence received was that the reduction in grade was what 
the Agency thought was just and consistent with prior discipline. 
Therefore, it was for Lunnen's benefit that further proof of 
consistency was required. {Ibid.f pp. 2-3.) 
The CSRB hearing officer did not state 1:1 :iat: IVli 1 in men s discipline was not 
appropriate, as argued in the latter's Brief. Having found just cause to discipline Mr. Lunnen, 
the examiner stated that the remaining issue to be decided was that of "the degree of severity 
of the disciplinary penalty, since neither party had argued the issues of severity, consistency or 
latitude of discipline," (Step 5 Decision, Contrary to Mr. Lunnen's argument that the 
hearing officer dml not Hi f his - * * , B** , p. i)% evidentia examinei 
specifically determined that Lunnenfs demotion was consistent with t *N' s ****'• --:• i imposed 
sanctions "for one act of insubordination." Mr. Lunnen misreads the Step 5 Decision when 
he contends that the evidentiaiy record lacks substantial evidence for sustaining his 
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Department. 
The Interim Order states that, 'The Agency offered one instance of insubordination and 
a commensurate demotion as proof of consistency of application" (Ibidf p. 8). Next, the 
hearing officer concluded: "The Agency has not provided any proof that the demotion of 
Lunnen is consistent with prior discipline for one act of insubordination" (Ibid) On that basis, 
Board finds that the record of the Step 5 proceedings contains sufficient credible substantial 
evidence of UDOTs consistency of discipline upon which to satisfy the standard of R13 7-1-20 
C 2 The record evidence, based upon the facts and circumstances of Mr. Lunncn's case, 
establishes just cause for his demotion and absent an excessive, disproportionate or abusive 
penalty. Consequently, the Board concludes that it was not necessary to have the Department 
further validate its decision by requirinig an additional showing on the issue of consistency of 
discipline (Sec below ' ) 
R E O p £ N I N G T H E £ V 1 I ) E N T I A R Y R E U U K D 
A. Resolution of Issues at Step 5 Proceedings 
In his Interim Order, the hearing officer sought to resolve three pertinent issues. The 
first issue concerned Mr. Lunnen's argument that UDOT had failed to implement a corrective 
action plan under R477-10-2. The trier of fact resolved this issue when he concluded that a 
misconduct fall under R477-11-1, which concerns insubordination, misfeasance, malfeasance and 
nonfeasance or disobeying the orders of a superior (Ibid, pp. 6-7). As to the second or 
misconduct issue, the examiner concluded that Mr. Lunnen had disobeyed the orders of a 
superior, and that his disobedience constituted insubordination (Ibid., pp. 7-8). According to 
the hearing officer, that left one last issue to be resolved: . . . whether or not the demotion 
[of Mr. Lunnen] Is consistent 'with other employees1 disciplinary penalties for insubordination," 
tion and a commensurate demotion as proof of consistency for insubordination.^ if et in the 
following paragraph the Interim Order offers this contradictoiy statement: "The Agency has 
not provided any proof that the demotion of Lunnen is consistent with prior discipline for one 
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Ml JI insuborduiain^i " II mi n \idi J <,.<iii% ijihau li. IJ flu rccnTcJ open2 iu order "l.> 
the Department to submit supplemental proof of consistent discipline in first-an insubordiiu 
tion incidents. 
B. Adequate Credible Substantial Evidence in the Record 
The Step 5 proceedings* evidentiary record contains sufficiently credible substantial 
evidence anent U D O T s prior discipline for a one-act offense of insubordination- District 2 
Director Sturzencgger related an incident two years previously when another District 2 
when notified (T. 18) According to Mi Sturzcnegger, that employee had been c a lie •  i 'q* .lit : • 
a few times" previously without responding (T. 19). On this occasion, the employee was at 
home; he was called, answered the Dispatch call, but deliberately failed to respond. The Tooele 
employee's insubordination resulted in a two-grade demotion coupled with a ten or eleven 
percent pay decrease3 (T. 19). Hence, there is sufficient credible substantial evidence in 
Director Sturzenegger's unrebutted testimony regarding the Tooele employee's insubordinate 
burden of showing that it did not impose an excessive, disprop ortionate on abusive penalty upon 
Mr. Lunnen. Therefore, the Department was not required to show supplemental proof 
regarding consistent treatment vis-a-vis Mr. Lunnen's penalty. 
As the Department presented substantial evidence of a prior case in which a similarly 
situated UDOT employee was demoted two grades with an accompanying greater pay loss for 
not responding to call-outs after many efforts by his supervisors, we hold that the Step 5 
incorrect. However, it is clear from both the Interim Order and the final Step 5 Decision that 
the hearing officer committed a misstatement rather than harmful error. The evidentiaiy 
examiner's request foi UDOT to produce more information regarding penalties for 
insubordinate employees only benefitted Mr. Lunnen. This error, which favored Mr. Lunnen, 
was de minimis, and neither harmful nor consequential to his interests. In sum, we conclude 
that it was a moot issue for our hearing officer to have requested supplemental disciplinary 
examples from UDOT regarding first-offense insii ibordinatioi in 
Another aspect of the Step 5 proceedings compels clarification, l he hearing examiner 
concentrated on Mr. Lunnenfs failure in not reporting for an emergency call-out on June 12, 
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after replying by telephone that he would. The hearing officer characterized this incident as 
"one act of insubordination," and as "a first time insubordination," (Interim Order, pp. i 
also, Step 5 Decision p 2) Wt find that Mi I Aim ici i s clem and pay reduction was 
a t i ^ m c c t j n g ^th supervisors on April 2 that he needed to improve his call-out response. 
Also, Ills response rate from January through June 21 was an unacceptable twenty percent. 
Moreover, Appellant's performance appraisals for FY90-91 and 91-92 directed his attention to 
his continuing problem of not satisfactorily responding to emergency call-outs. Mr. Lunnen had 
a substantial work history of not properly responding to emergency call-outs. That unsatisfacto-
ry work history was pointed out in all three disciplinary documents: Sturzenegger's July 7 
record were the cause of his pending demotion, not just "one act of insubordination," T^* 
Department's penalty was based upon the totality of Mr. Lunnen's insubordinate behavior over 
a lengthy period of time, not just for his failure on June 12. 
C. Meeting Burden - Discipline 
The Department had the burden of proof when the Step 5 proceedings commenced 
correct in relation to the facts and circumstances, then the burden is on the employee to show 
that the penalty imposed was disproportionate or otherwise constituted an abuse of discretion 
(R137-1-20 C 2.). Certainly inconsistency of treatment between similarly situated employees 
could be a showing of disproportion, which could constitute an abuse of discretion. An abuse 
of discretion results when a sanction is so unreasonable that it offends reasonable minds. 
1 4 7 7-11-1, Disciplinary Action). 
D. Rcopcninp Step 5 Proceedings 
At the conclusion of Mr. Lunnen's Step 5 proceeding on November 13,1992, the CSRB 
hearing officer remarked in his closing comment: 
HEARING OFFICER: Thank you very much. That will close 
argument in this case. An opinion will be rendered in writing in 
twenty days beginning tomorrow to be provided to both parties 
and counsel. I appreciate your professionalism, and if s been a 
pleasure to have you before me (T. 217). 
Concededly, the hearing examine! had indeed "closed argument,H although his exact words did 
implies a closing of the evid- s ntiai y record a! that time- Hence, we assume that the record was 
intended to be closed and was, in fact, closed at that time. 
In his Interim Order, under the section labeled "Order," th< \ Step 5 hearing officer 
stated: 
Pending modification or validation of the discipline, the record 
shall remain open; This hearing and its record shall remain open 
for purposes of appeal by Grievant until the discipline is imposed 
and the time for appeal shall commence subsequent to a modifica-
tion of this Order which imposes the discipline (Page 9). 
However, Mr. Lunnen argues in his Brief (pp. 9-10) that, "Step 5 hearing officers do not 
open where, under R137-1-20 F., the parties agree to submit posthearing briefs. According to 
Mr. Lunnen, "Absent such an agreement, R137-1-20 E. prohibits the presentation of further 
evidence and the hearing officer is thereafter required to prepare Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law pursuant to R137-1-20 G." To further support his position, Appellant has 
included another CSRB hearing officer's ruling which denied an agency's request to re-open 
a Step 5 proceeding several days after the record * as closed ai id the proceeding had adjourn s dill 
had requested to re-open the evidentiary proceedings to offer rebuttal testimony from a witness 
not previously called but referred to in the grievant's testimony. Basing her denial on R137-1-
20 E , the Board's hearing officer concluded that it would constitute an abuse of discretion for 
her to re-open a hearing for the taking of additional evidence, once it had been formally closed. 
The basis for that hearing officer's denial was "because no specific provisions are set forth to 
do so.99 In the given circumstances, that hearing officer's decision was reasonable and legally 
supportable. The Board determined that is was not necessary to re-open the hearing because 
there was ample substantial evidence in the i ecord to otherwise reach a proper decision {Kent, 
p. 12). 
There are provisions that enable our factfinders to obtain additional information within 
their discretionary ambit. For example, R137-1-17 A. states: 
Conduct. The purpose of a hearing is to provide a fair and 
impartial opportunity to be heard so that the hearing officer may 
be completely informed in the matter and enabled to render a 
proper determination based on all the facts and applicable laws 
and rules. 
Thus, to "be completely informed in the matter* a hearing officer may require additional 
information from time to time. Also, R137-1-20 F. provides for the admission of posthcaring 
briefs and memoranda ol I  i* to be submitted along with posthcaring documents." That 
"insure the development of a clear and complete record.9* Of particulai import is 11137-1 20 
J.: 
Scope of Remedy/Relief. If the hearing officer finds that the 
action complained of which was taken by the appointing authority 
was too severe, even though for good cause, the hearing officer 
may provide for such other remedy or relief as deemed appropri-
ate and in the best interest of the respective parties. 
A hearing officer may well have a complete and correct understanding of all case facts, 
all applicable rules and laws, and have all relevant pieces of information sorted out at the 
conclusion of the hearing. But not always 1 lean ing officers n lay need further time and 
request for additional information in £ urn tei r where he issued a subsequent Interim Order 
delineating the information he should receive from the agency, is not contrary to the CSRB 
hearing officer's ruling in Kent, above. In the Kent decision, an agency sought on its own 
motion to rebut testimony by later supplementing the Step 5 record after the record had been 
closed and the proceedings adjourned The facts an id circumstances of both cases are 
discretionary decisions by our hearing officei s 
Essentially, we hold that where our hearing officer reasonably justifies reopening a 
Step 5 proceeding, that our hearing officer has sufficient discretion and authority to do so to 
satisfy the ends of justice, to conduct a full and fair hearing, and to make a complete record. 
The UAPA does not prohibit the CSRB hearing officer/presiding officer from re-opening an 
evidentiary proceeding. 
According to Mr. Lunnen, the Step 5 Decision violated the UAPA, the residuum rule, 
and Utah Court of Appeals' holding in the Tolman case. These claimed violations challenge 
the Interim Order's request for and the Step 5 Decision's acceptance of what the hearing 
officer called the Departments "best proof of what discipline is consistently given to employees 
of the Agency for a first ti n ic insubordination, i.e., failure to obey the order of a supervisor," 
foundation, factual basis or trustworthiness. Mr. Lunncn feels strongly that his due process 
rights have been violated by the process used to bring these documents into the record below. 
This tribunal has given serious consideration to Appellant's argument. We understand 
Mr. Lunncn's concerns regarding UDOTs evidence that was received after the evidentiary 
proceeding went off the record. Furthermore, the Board comprehends the hearing officer's 
pur|K*sc in requesting riiMnional proof from the Department on the issue of consistency and 
disciplined for similar acts of insubordination. 
Grievance hearings are neither criminal nor civil proceedings, and differcr 
standards and procedures apply. With sufficient due process granted to both parties, uic 
hearing officer may need to gather additional facts and information on matters specific 
case. Whether to "re-open" the entire proceeding or just the record falls within the hearing 
• o fficei *s discretion: i lii i the Lunnen case, the hearing officer was charged to adjudicate two 
require additional factfinding after the evidentiary proceeding has been closed li i wi iting a 
factually accurate and a well reasoned decision, the hearing officer may require that further 
factual information be adduced, so that all issues raised are adequately addressed and 
purposefully resolved. This is to be accomplished temperately and with a mind to each party's 
proper burdens. Burdens can and do shift on occasion during administrative proceedings. 
another. 
The CSRBfs rules permit the Board to remand a case to the original hearing officer for 
additional evidence-taking (R137-1-21 G.). Another provision, R137-1-21 H. 3., permits the 
Board to re-open a case and supplement or amend the record. Also, the Board has authority 
to compel new or additional evidence on its own motion (§67-19a-202(3)(c) and R137-1-21 B.)-
Hie Board, then, has several means of gaining additional information even though the 
Moreover, either party to a grievance hearing may request a reconsideration at Step 5 
(R137-1-20 M.) or Step 6 (R137-1-21 X), which is a re-examination of a decision permitted by 
law (§63-46b-13). 
We conclude that it is not necessary to rule upon Mr. Lunnen's third issue, because the 
record contains District- Director Sturzenegger's clear testimony that constitutes sufficient 
not need to request additional IINI si proof* from i , I I DO! ' because: Di ector Sturzencgger's 
testimony of the District 2 Tooele employee's misconduct and disciplinary penalty satisfies the 
element of consistency and shows just cause for Mr, Lunnen's penalty under the CSRB's 
standard at R137-1-20 C 2. Consequently, because the case record, through the transcript, 
contains sufficient evidence to satisfactorily determine the issue of consistency/abusive 
and finding them moot, it is not i i s cessai y to further address them. 
DECISION 
The hearing officer's Step 5 Decision is affirmed. Mr. Lunnen's appeal to Step 6 is 
denied and therefore his remedy or relief cannot be granted. We hope that through improved 
many years of service to the state of Utah and the Department. 
DECISION UNANIMOUS. 
Bruce T. Jones, Chairman 
Jean M. Bishop, Member 
David M. Hilbig, Member 
Jose L. Trujillo, Member 
DATED this / ^ day of October 1993. 
ENDNOTES 
1. Mr. Lumen's Brief at pages 2 and 9 mentions an eleven percent pay rate mdmAkm. However, fiat percentage • incorrect a* the penalty rate impoted 
was actually 175 percent (Jt. Eaht. 7), which eonstruted the percentage amount between ttepi on the Ltgiftlature's newly authorized "step pay plan * 
In Jury 1992. the Suu adopted the new "tap pay plan* enacted during the Legislature's 1992 general aeation. See afca Interim Order, Finding No. 13, 
Thus, Mr. Lumen's actuaJ pay rate decrease was much lata severe than he presented in nil Step 6 Brief. 
2. Ai staled on the Interim Order's Inst pate: 
. . . (T]he Agency had the authority to discipline Lnnnen and that Lnnneo was iuiabordinata i 
discipline imposed shall be held m abeyance pending proof by the Agency that it is consistent with other 
similarly situated employees. The Agency shall submit to this Hearing Officer . . . its beat proof of what 
discipline is consistently given to employees of the Agency for a first time smsuboreunaiion, i a^  failure 
so obey the order of a superior . . . . 
Pending modification or validation of the dmcxA M record shall remain open . . . . 
3. There is ambiguity in the record is to whctl: tc i till , t Tooele employee received - i t : :>r an eleven percent pay 
reduction. Both figures were cited side by side, 
4. R137.1-20 E reads: 
dosing of the Record. After all testimony, documentary evidence, and arguments have been presented 
the hearing officer ihaU dose the record and terminate the proceeding, unless one or both parties agree 
to submit a posthearing brief within a specified time. 
RECONSIDERATION 
A party may apply for reconsideration of a Step 6 decision through R137-1.21 J and Utah Cod* UnannoiaUd, 
ff&46b.tt. 
JUDICIAL REVIEW 
A party nay petition for Judicial review of a final agency action pursuant to Utah Cmit Vmaimouumi, 
§65-466-14 and -16. 
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ADDENDUi 
U t a h Code Ann . § 6 3 - 4 6 b - 1 6 (1993) 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-l 
adjudicative proceedings. 
(1) AS provided by statute, the Supreme Court or the Court 
of Appeals has jurisdiction to review all final agency action 
resulting from formal adjudicative proceedings. 
(2) (a) To seek judicial review of final agency action 
resulting from formal adjudicative proceedings, the petitioner 
shall file a petition for review of agency action with the 
appropriate appellate court in the form required by the appellate 
rules of the appropriate appellate court. 
(b) The appellate rules of the appropriate appellate court 
shall govern all additional filings and proceedings in the 
appellate court. 
(3) The contents, transmittal, and filing of the agency's 
record for judicial review of formal adjudicative proceedings are 
governed by the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, except that: 
(a) all parties to the review proceedings may stipulate to 
shorten, summarize, or organize the record; 
(b) the appellate court may tax the cost: of preparing 
transcripts and copies for the record: 
(i) against a party who unreasonably refuses to stipulate 
to shorten, summarize, or organize the record; or 
(ii) according to any other provision of law. 
( 4) The appellate court shall grant relief only if, on the 
basis of the agency's record, it determines that a person seeking 
judicial review has been substantially prejudiced by any of the 
following: 
(a) the agency action, or the statute or rule on which the 
agency action is based, is unconstitutional on its face or as 
applied; 
(b) the agency acted beyond tl le ji iri sdiction conferred 
by any statute; (c) the agerici ;.>l - l ev ied a l l of the issues requir ing 
resolution; 
(d) the agency has erroneously interpreted or applied the 
law; 
(e) the agency has engaged in an unlawful procedure or 
decision-making process, or has failed to follow'prescribed 
procedure; 
(f) the persons taking the agency action were illegally 
constituted as a decision-making body or were subject to 
disqualification; 
(g) the agency action is based upon a determination of 
fact, made or implied by the agency, that is not supported by 
substantial evidence when viewed in light of the whole record 
before the court; 
(h) the agency action is: 
(i) an abuse < r t-he discretion delegated to the agency by 
statute; 
(ii) contrary to a rule of the agency; 
(iii) contrary to the agency's prior practice, unless the 
agency justifies the inconsistency by giving facts and reasons 
that demonstrate a fair and rational basis for the inconsistency; 
or 
(.' % otherwise arbitrary or capricious. 
ADDENDUM E 
Utah Code Ann. § 67-19-18 (1993) 
Utah Code Ann. § 67-19-18. Dismissals and demotions - Grounds -
Disciplinary action - Procedure - Reductions in force. 
(1) Career service employees may be dismissed or demoted 
only to advance the good of the public interest, and for just 
causes such as inefficiency, incompetency, failure to maintain 
skills or adequate performance levels, insubordination, 
disloyalty to the orders of a superior, misfeasance, malfeasance, 
or nonfeasance in office. 
(2) Employees may not be dismissed because of race, sex, 
age, physical handicap, national origin, religion, political 
affiliation, or other nonmerit factor including the exercise of 
rights under this chapter. 
(3) The director shall establish rules governing the 
procedural and documentary requirements of disciplinary 
dismissals and demotions. 
(4) If an agency head finds that a career service employee 
is charged with aggravated misconduct or that retention of a 
career service employee would endanger the peace and safety of 
others or pose a grave threat to the public interest, the 
employee may be suspended pending the administrative appeal to 
the department head as provided in Subsection (5). 
(5) (a) No career service employee may be demoted or 
dismissed unless the department head or designated representative 
has complied with this subsection. 
(b) The department head or designated representative 
notifies the employee in writing of the reasons for the dismissal 
or demotion. 
(c) The employee has no less than five working days to 
reply and have the reply considered by the department head. 
(d) The employee has an opportunity to be heard by the 
department head or designated representative. 
(e) Following the hearing, the employee may be dismissed or 
demoted if the department head finds adequate cause or reason. 
(6) (a) Reductions in force required by inadequate funds, 
change of workload, or lack of work are governed by retention 
rosters established by the director. 
(b) Under those circumstances: 
(i) The agency head shall designate the category of work 
to be eliminated, subject to review by the director. 
(ii) Temporary and probationary employees shall be 
separated before any career service employee. 
(iii) (A) Career service employees shall be separated in 
the order of their retention points, the employee with the lowest 
points to be discharged first. 
(B) Retention points for each career service employee 
shall be computed according to rules established by the director 
allowing appropriate consideration for proficiency and for 
seniority in state government, including any active duty military 
service fulfilled subsequent to original state appointment. 
(iv) A career service employee who is separated in a 
reduction in force shall be: 
(A) placed on the reappointment roster provided for in 
Subsection 67-19-17(2); and 
(B) reappointed without examination to any vacancy for 
which the employee is qualified which occurs within one year of 
the date of the separation. 
(c) (i) An employee separated due to a reduction in force 
may appeal to the department head for an administrative review. 
(ii) The notice of appeal must be submitted within 20 
working days after the employee's receipt of written notification 
of separation. 
(iii) The employee may appeal the decision of the 
department head according to the grievance and appeals procedure 
of this act. 
ADDENDUM F 
Utah Admin Code. R137-1-20 (1993) 
R137-1-20. Evidentiary/Step 5 Hearings, 
A. Authority of Hearing Officers. The hearing officer is 
empowered to: 
1. maintain order, insure the development of a clear and 
complete record, rule upon offers of proof, and receive relevant 
evidence; 
2. set reasonable limits on repetitive and cumulative 
testimony and exclude any witness whose later testimony might be 
colored by the testimony of another witness or any person whose 
presence might have a chilling effect on another testifying 
witness; 
3. rule on motions, exhibit lists, and proposed findings; 
4. require the filing of memoranda of law and the presentation 
of oral argument with respect to any question of law;( 
5. compel testimony and order the production of evidence and 
the appearance of witnesses; and 
6. admit evidence that has reasonable and probative value. 
B. Conduct of Hearings. A hearing shall be confined to those 
issues related to the subject matter presented in the original 
grievance statement. 
1. An evidentiary proceeding shall not be allowed to develop 
into a general inquiry into the policies and operations of an 
agency. 
2. An evidentiary proceeding is intended solely to receive 
evidence that either refutes or substantiates specific claims or 
charges. It shall not be made an occasion for irresponsible 
accusations, general attacks upon the character or conduct of the 
employing agency or the employee or others, or for making 
derogatory assertions having no bearing on the claims or specific 
matters under review. 
C. Evidentiary/Step 5 Hearing. An evidentiary/step 5 hearing 
shall be a new hearing for the record, held de novo, with both 
parties being granted full administrative process as follows: 
1. The CSRB hearing officer shall first make factual findings 
based solely on the evidence presented at the hearing without 
deference to any prior factual findings of the agency. The CSRB 
hearing officer shall then determine whether: (a) the factual 
findings made from the evidentiary/step 5 hearing support with 
substantial evidence the allegations made by the agency or the 
appointing authority, and (b) the agency has correctly applied 
relevant policies, rules, and statutes. 
2. When the CSRB hearing officer determines in accordance with 
the procedures set forth above that the evidentiary/step 5 
factual findings support the allegations of the agency or the 
appointing authority, then the CSRB hearing officer must 
determine whether the agency's decision, including any 
disciplinary sanctions imposed, is excessive, disproportionate or 
otherwise constitutes an abuse of discretion. In making this 
latter determination, the CSRB hearing officer shall give 
deference to the decision of the agency or the appointing 
authority unless the agency's penalty is determined to be 
excessive, disproportionate or constitutes an abuse of discretion 
in which instance the CSRB hearing officer shall determine the 
appropriate remedy. 
D. Discretion. Upon commencement, the hearing officer shall 
announce that the hearing is convened and is henceforth on the 
record. The hearing officer shall note appearances for the 
record and shall determine which party has the burden of moving 
forward. 
E. Closing of the Record. After all testimony, documentary 
evidence, and arguments have been presented, the hearing officer 
shall close the record and terminate the proceeding, unless one 
or both parties agree to submit a posthearing brief within a 
specified time. 
ADDENDUM G 
Utah Admin. Code R137-1-21 (1993) 
Rl37-1-21. The Board and the Appellate Procedure. 
A. Transcript Production. The party appealing the hearing 
officer's decision to the board at the appellate/step 6 level 
shall order production of the evidentiary/step 5 proceeding's 
transcript from the court reporter. The appellant shall share an 
equal payment with the CSRB Office to the court reporting firm. 
1. Transcript production cost-sharing applies only to the 
appellant and to the CSRB Office. The former receives the 
transcript original; the latter receives a transcript copy. 
2. The respondent may inquire of the CSRB Office about 
obtaining a transcript copy, or may directly purchase a copy from 
the court reporting firm. 
B. Briefs. An appeal hearing before the board is based upon 
the evidentiary record previously established by the hearing 
officer. No additional or new evidence is permitted unless 
compelled by the board. 
1. The appellant in a step 6 proceeding must obtain the 
transcript of the step 5 hearing. After receipt of the 
transcript, the appellant has 30 calendar days to file an 
original and six copies of a brief with the administrator. 
Additionally, the respondent must be provided with a copy of the 
appellant's brief. 
2. Upon receipt of a copy of the appellant's brief, the 
respondent then has 30 calendar days to file an original and six 
copies of a reply brief with the administrator. 
3. Briefs are distributed to board members upon receipt from 
both parties. 
4. All briefs shall be hand delivered, sent by the U.S. Postal 
Service postage prepaid, or sent through the state's Central 
Mailing. 
5. Briefs shall be date-stamped upon receipt in the CSRB 
Office. 
6. The time frame for receiving briefs shall be modified or 
waived only for good cause as determined by the administrator. 
C. Rules of Procedure. The following rules are applicable to 
appeal hearings before the board: 
1. Dismissal of Appeal. Upon a motion by either party or upon 
its own motion, the board may dismiss any appeal prior to holding 
a formal appeal hearing if the appeal is clearly moot, without 
merit, not properly filed, or not within the scope of the board's 
authority. 
2. Notice. Written notice of the date, time, place, and 
issues for hearing by the board shall be given to the aggrieved 
employee, to the employee's counsel or representative, to the 
agency, and to the agency's counsel or representative, at least 
five days before the date set for the hearing. 
3. Compelling Evidence. The board may compel evidence in the 
conduct of its appeals. 
4. Oral Argument/Time Limitation. As a general rule, the 
board restricts the oral argument to 30 minutes, or less, per 
party. The board may grant additional time as it deems 
appropriate. 
5. Oral Argument Set Aside. If the board determines that oral 
argument is unnecessary, the parties shall be so notified, but 
they may be expected to appear before the board at the date, 
time, and place set to answer any questions raised by the board 
members. 
6. Argument or Memoranda. Oral argument or written memoranda 
may be required of the parties at the board's discretion. 
D. The Board's Standards of Review. The board's standards of 
review shall be based upon the following criteria: 
1. The board shall first make a determination of whether the 
factual findings of the CSRB hearing officer are reasonable and 
rational according to the substantial evidence standard. If the 
board determines that the factual findings of the CSRB hearing 
officer are not reasonable and rational based on the 
evidentiary/step 5 record as a whole, then the board may, in its 
discretion, correct the factual findings, and/or make new or 
additional factual findings. 
2. Once the board has either determined that the factual 
findings of the CSRB hearing officer are reasonable and rational 
or has corrected the factual findings based upon the 
evidentiary/step 5 record as a whole, the board must then 
determine whether the CSRB hearing officer has correctly applied 
the relevant policies, rules, and statutes according to the 
correctness standard, with no deference being granted to the 
evidentiary/step 5 decision of the CSRB hearing officer. 
3. Finally, the board must determine whether the decision of 
the CSRB hearing officer, including the totality of the sanctions 
imposed by the agency, is reasonable and rational based upon the 
ultimate factual findings and correct application of relevant 
policies, rules, and statutes determined according to the above 
provisions. 
ADDENDUM H 
Utah Admin Code R477-11-1 (1993) 
R477-11-1. Disciplinary Action. 
Noncompliance with these rules, departmental or other 
applicable policies and safety policies, professional standards 
adopted by a department, work place policies, and such matters as 
inefficiency, incompetency, failure to maintain skills, adequate 
performance levels, insubordination, disloyalty to the orders of 
a superior, misfeasance, malfeasance, nonfeasance or failure to 
advance the good of the career service shall be cause for 
disciplinary action. For purposes of R477-11, employee shall 
mean career service employee unless indicated otherwise. 
11-1. (1) The type and severity of any disciplinary action 
taken shall be governed by principles of due process which 
include: 
(1)(a) Consistent application 
(1)(b) Prior knowledge of rules and standards 
(1)(c) Determination of fact 
(1)(d) Timely notice of noncompliance 
(1)(e) Opportunity to respond and rebut as defined herein 
11-1. (2) If the agency determines that a career service 
employee is charged with aggravated or repetitive misconduct or 
that the retention of a career service employee would endanger 
the peace and safety of others or pose a grave threat to the 
public interest, the agency, pending an investigation to 
determine fact upon which disciplinary action may be taken, shall 
utilize one or more of the following options: 
(2)(a) The employee may be placed on paid administrative leave 
(suspension with pay). 
(2)(b) The employee may be temporarily reassigned to another 
position or different work location at the same rate of pay 
pending the completion of the investigation. 
11-1.(3) In all cases, except as provided under Section 
67-19-18(4) the disciplinary process includes the following: 
(3)(a) The agency representative notifies the employee in 
writing of the proposed discipline and the reasons therefor; 
(3)(b) The employee has five working days within which to 
reply and have the reply considered by the agency representative 
before discipline is imposed; 
(3) (c) If an employee waives the right to respond or does not 
reply within the time frames stated in these rules or as 
established by the agency representative, whichever is longer, 
discipline may still be imposed in accordance with these rules. 
(3)(d) The employee and the agency representative may agree in 
writing to waive or extend any grievance step, or the time limits 
specified for any grievance step. 
11-1.(4) After an employee has been informed of the reasons 
for the proposed discipline and has been given an opportunity to 
respond and be responded to, discipline may be imposed by the 
agency representative as appropriate. In determining the 
specific type and severity of the discipline to be taken, 
consideration may be given to such factors as the severity of the 
infraction, the repeated nature of violations, prior 
disciplinary/corrective actions, previous oral warnings, written 
warnings and discussions, the employee's past work record, the 
effect on agency operations, and the potential of the violations 
for causing damage to persons or property. Disciplinary action 
may include one or more of the following options: 
(4)(a) Written reprimand. 
(4)(b) Suspension of the employee without pay up to 3 0 
calendar days per occurrence requiring discipline. 
(4)(c) Demotion of the employee utilizing one of the following 
methods as provided by law: 
1) An employee may be moved from a position in one class to a 
position in another class having a lower entrance salary if the 
duties of the position have been reduced for disciplinary 
reasons. 
2) A demotion within the employee's current pay range may be 
accomplished by lowering the employee's salary rate back on the 
range, as determined by the department head or designee. 
(4)(d) A department head shall dismiss or demote an employee 
only in accordance with the provision of Section 67-19-18 (5). 
See R477-11-2 of these rules. 
(4)(e) Disciplinary actions are subject to the grievance and 
appeals procedure as provided by law. 
11-1. (5) At the time disciplinary action is imposed the 
employee shall be notified in writing of the discipline, the 
reasons for the discipline, the effective date and length of the 
discipline and the standard of conduct necessary to avoid further 
discipline. 
ADDENDUM I 
Utah Admin Code R477-11-2 (1993) 
R477-11-2. Dismissal or Demotion. 
An employee may be dismissed or demoted for cause as explained 
under R477-10-2 and 11-1 of these rules as follows: 
11-2. (1) A department head or appointing officer may dismiss 
an employee having other than career service status, without 
right of appeal, upon providing written notification to the 
employee specifying the reasons for the dismissal and the 
effective date. 
11-2. (2) No employee shall be dismissed or demoted from a 
career service position unless the department head or designee 
has observed the following procedures and the Grievance Procedure 
Rules: 
(2)(a) The department head or designee shall notify the 
employee in writing of the specific reasons for the dismissal or 
demotion. 
(2)(b) The employee shall have no less than five working days 
to reply and to have the reply considered by the department head 
or designee. 
(2)(c) The employee shall have an opportunity to be heard by 
the department head or designee. 
(2)(d) Following such a hearing an employee may be dismissed 
or demoted if the department head finds adequate cause or reason. 
11-2. (3) Agency management may suspend an employee with pay 
pending the administrative appeal to the department head as 
provided by law under Section 67-19-18 (14). 
ADDENDUM J 
Neal v. Department of health and Human Serv. 
46 M.S.P.R. 26 (1990) 
§ N«AL * men. OF HEALTH A HUMAN wamam 
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Sharon NEAL, Appellant, 
v. 
DEPARTMENT OP HEALTH AND HUMAN 8ERV1CB8, Agency* 
HQ7121t91tft36. 
Merit Systems Protection Board. 
Aug. 17, 1990, 
Employee requested review of arbitration decision that sus-
ained agency's action removing her .from position of claims devel-
>pment clerk for unacceptable performance. The Merit Systems 
Protection Board held that: (1) appellant's bare allegations of 
iispsrate treatment and discrimination before both arbitrator and 
the Board, without specific reference to protected categories under 
itatute defining prohibited personnel practices, failed to establish 
Board's jurisdiction to review arbitration award, and (2) appellant's 
reference to merit systems principles did not establish basis for 
Board to take jurisdiction over appeal from arbitration decision. 
Request dismissed* 
1. Merit Protection *>»1«3 
Merit Systems Protection Board may review an arbitration 
award only if employee has been affected by prohibited personnel 
practice, and action is otherwise appealable. 5, U.S.C.A. 
i f 2302(bXl), 7121(d), 7702. 
t. Merit Protection *»24 
Appellant has burden of proving by preponderance of the 
evidence that the Merit Systems Protection Board has jurisdiction 
to hear case. 5 C.F.R. } 1201.66(a)(2)(i). 
t. Merit Protection #»1#3 
Appellant's bare allegations of disparate treatment and discrim-
ination before both arbitrator and the Merit Systems Protection 
Board, without specific reference to protected categories under 
statute defining prohibited personnel practices, failed to establish 
Board's jurisdiction to review arbitration award, 5 U.S.C.A. 
3 2302^X1), 7121(d). Merit Protection «»ltS Appellant's reference to*merit systems principles did not estal 
lish basis for Board to take jurisdiction over appeal from arbitratio 
decision. 5 U.S.C.A. § 2301(b). 
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Merit Protection ••# 
Merit systems principles are intended to furnish guidelines to 
federal agencies and do not constitute an independent basis for 
legal action. 
William P. McKillen, American Federation of Government Em-
ployees, Greendale, Wis., for appellant 
Hoyt C. Griffin, Jr., Chicago, III, for agency. 
Before LEVINSON, Chairman, JOHNSON, Vice-Chairman and PARKS, Member. 
OPINION AND ORDER 
The appellant has requested review of a May 30,1989 arbitration 
decision that sustained the agency's action removing her from the 
position of Claims Development Clerk based on unacceptable per-
formance. In its response to the appellant's request, the agency 
asserts that the Board lacks jurisdiction to review the arbitration 
award because the appellant has not raised a claim of discrimination 
under 6 U.S.C. § 2302(bXl). Because it appeared that the Board 
lacks jurisdiction over the matter appealed, the Clerk of the Board 
issued an order on June 6, 1990, providing the appellant with an 
opportunity to clarify her claims of disparate treatment and discrim-
ination. 
The appellant has responded to the Board's order, and the agency 
has replied to the appellant's response. For the reasons set forth 
below, we DISMISS the appellant*! request for review of the 
arbitration award for lack of jurisdiction. 
ANALYSIS 
fl,S] As explained in the order, the Board may review an arbi-
tration award under 6 U.S.C, $ 7121(d) only if the employee has 
been affected by a prohibited personnel practice under 5 U.S.C. 
f 2302(bXl) and the action is otherwise appealable under 5 U.S.C. | 7702. See Salinas tr. Immigration and Naturalization Service, 
U M.S.P.JL 653, 564 (1987), affa\ 846 F.2d 77 (Ped.Cir.1988) (Table). 
As further stated, the appellant has the burden of proving by 
preponderant evidence that the Board has jurisdiction to hear the 
case. See 6 C.F.R. § 1201.56(a)(2)(i). 
[S] In her request for Board review of the arbitration award, the 
appellant does not raise a claim of prohibited discrimination, nor 
does she raise the arbitrator's failure to make a specific finding on 
her claim of disparate treatment Appeal File, Tab 3, Appellant's 
Brief. Similarly, in her response to the Board's order, the appellant 
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has failed to identify any discrimination of the type prohibited by 5 
UJSLC. § 2302(bXl>* Rather, she simply asserts that "the record as 
a whole" shows "disparate treatment/discrimination'9 and that the 
agency ''discriminated" against her in creating the performance 
standards for her position. 
Based upon our review of the record, we find that the appellant's 
bare allegations of disparate treatment and discrimination before 
both the arbitrator and the Board, without specific reference to any 
of the protected categories under 6 UJ5.C. § 2302(b)(1), fail to 
establish the Board's jurisdiction to review the arbitration award 
under 6 UJS.C. § 7121(d). Compare, e.g., Ogden Air Logistic* 
Center v. American Federation of Government Employee*, 6 
MSPB 531, 6 M.S.P.R. 630, 63S-36 (1981) (mere assertion that the 
agency's action violated 5 U.S.C. 5 2902(b) is insufficient to estab-
lish the Board's jurisdiction under 6 U.S.C. { 7121(d)), with 
MeCtain v. Department of the Air Force, 87 MJ3.P.R. 658, 665 
(1988) (the Board has jurisdiction to review an arbitration award 
under 6 UJ5.C. ( 7121(d) where the appellant asserted the prohibit-
ed personnel practice of handicap discrimination based on alcohol 
abuse and the removal action could have, been appealed to, the 
Board under 6 UJ5.G Chapter 75). 
ft i ] - We also find that the- appellant's reference to ptovisiona in 
§ UJ3.C. f 2801(b) does not establish a basis for.the Board to take 
jurisdiction over this appeaL The merit systems principles are 
intended to furnish guidance to Federal agencies and do not consti-
tute an; independent basis for legal action*. See Middleton m. 
Department of Justice, 23 MJSJP.R. 223,. 227 n. 6 (1984), affd, 776 
F.2d 1060 (Fed.Cir.1985) (Table); Welle v Harris, 1 MSPB 199,1 
M.S.P.R. 208,214-15 (1979). Accordingly, the appellant's citation to 
the merit systems principles does not establish a cause of action. 
ORDER 
This is the final order of the Merit Systems Protection Board in 
this appeal. 
NOTICE TO APPELLANT 
Ton have the right to request the United States Court of Appeals 
for the Federal Circuit to review the Board's, final decision in your 
appeal if the court has jurisdiction. See & UJS.C. 5 7703(a)(1). You 
must submit your request to the court at the following address: 
United States Court of Appeals 
for the Federal Circuit 
717 Madison Place, N.W. 
Washington, DC 20439 
The court must receive your request for review no later than 80 
calendar days after receipt of this order by your representative, if 
mm v. oJPJML 2i 
you have one, or receipt by you personally, whichever receipt occurs 
first See 6 U.S.C. { 7703(b)(1). 
For the Board: 
ROBERT E. TAYLOR 
WASHINGTON, D.C. 
flentmle C RINT, Appellant, 
v. 
OFFICE OF PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT k^mf f GSA I W? 740). 
8B*83109iatftl 
Merit Systems Protection Board 
Aug. 2Q, 1990. 
Appellant petitioned for review of initial decision which sus-
tained reconsideration decision of the Office of Personnel Manage-
ment (OPM) denying his application for a civil service retirement 
annuity. The Merit Systems Protection Board held that case would 
be remanded for further abjudication, in light of appellant's allega-
tion that he did not receive refund of retirement deductions, and 
OPM's failure to submit evidence that refund check was indeed 
sent, or received. 
Petition granted; initial decision vacated and remanded. 
Merit Protectioa ••311 
In light of applicant's allegation that he did not receive a 
refund of retirement deductions, and failure of Office of Personnel 
Management (OPM) to submit evidence that refund check was sent, 
or received, appeal from denial of application for civil service 
retirement annuity would be remanded for further abjudication. 
Sofronio C. Rint, Dau, Mabalacat, Pfcmpanga, Philippines, pro m. 
Kenneth Brown, Washington, D.C, for agency. 
<g 
Before LEVINSON, Chairman, JOHNSON, Vice Chairman, and 
PARKS, Member. 
